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ST. GEORGE TUCKER'S SECOND AMENDMENT:
DECONSTRUCTING "THE TRUE PALLADIUM OF
LIBERTY"
Stephen P. Halbrook I
A bill of rights may be considered, not only
as intended to give law, and assign limits to
a government about to be established, but as
giving information to the people. By reduc-
ing speculative truths to fundamental laws,
every man of the meanest capacity and un-
derstanding, may learn his own rights, and
know when they are violated ....
- St. George Tucker
2
Introduction
The Bill of Rights, according to the above view, is
designed to inform ordinary citizens of their rights. Its
meaning is not a monopoly of the governmental entities
whose powers the Bill of Rights was intended to limit. By
1 Attorney at Law, Fairfax, Va.; Ph.D. Florida State University, J.D.
Georgetown University; former philosophy professor, Tuskegee Uni-
versity, Howard University, George Mason University. Books include
A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989); FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK
(2007); FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS, 1866 -1876 (1998); THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984, 2000); THE FOUND-
ERS' SECOND AMENDMENT (forthcoming). Argued Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and other Supreme Court cases. See
further www.stephenhalbrook.com. © Copyright 2007 by Stephen P.
Halbrook. All rights reserved.
2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, View of the Constitution of the United States, in
1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. D at
308 (William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803).
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knowing when their rights are violated, the citizens may
signify their displeasure through mechanisms, such as the
ballot box and the jury box, and may resort to speech, the
press, assembly, and petition to denounce the evil. The
Second Amendment "right of the people to keep and bear
Arms" 3 was intended to serve as the ultimate check, which
the Founders hoped would dissuade people at the helm of
state from seeking to establish tyranny.
Although humble people generally think that they
are among "the people," a segment of the not-so-humble
appear to disagree when it comes to the right of "the
people" to keep and bear arms. 5 Did the Founders mean
what they seem to have said, or were their words too com-
plex for the common people to understand? The following
article seeks to provide some insights into that question
through an examination of the writings of St. George Tuck-
3 "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed." U.S. CONST. amend. H.
4 This view was expressed just ten days after Madison proposed the Bill
of Rights in Congress:
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people,
duly before them, may attempt to tyrannize, and as
the military forces which shall be occasionally raised
to defend our country, might pervert their power to
the injury of their fellow-citizens, the people are con-
firmed by the next article in their right to keep and
bear their private arms.
"A Pennsylvanian," Tench Coxe, Remarks on the First Part of the
Amendments to the Federal Constitution, FED. GAZETTE, June 18,
1789, at 2; see Stephen P. Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe
and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1787-1823, 7 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 347, 367 (1999).
5 "Half (50%) of the American population wrongly believe the Consti-
tution gives every citizen the right to own a handgun." HEARST RE-
PORT, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 27 (The Hearst Corp. 1987) (emphasis added).
8
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er and a recent reevaluation of those writings.
When Thomas Jefferson was elected as President of
the United States in 1801, students from the College of
William and Mary celebrated with a glass of wine at the
house of their acclaimed professor, Judge St. George Tuck-
er.6 Tucker was already at work writing what would be the
first and foremost treatise on the Constitution and Bill of
Rights. Published in 1803 and known as Tucker's Black-
stone, the work included the English jurist's Commentaries
along with Tucker's reflections on the American system.
7
During the American Revolution, Tucker had
smuggled in arms from the West Indies at the behest of
Governor Patrick Henry, 8 and as a militia colonel, Tucker
fought against British forces. 9 After the Revolution, Tuck-
er practiced law. Tucker, along with James Madison and
Edmund Randolph, was appointed to the Annapolis Con-
vention of 1786.10 The Annapolis Convention served as a
6 MARY HALDANE COLEMAN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER: CrIzEN OF No
MEAN CITY 127 (The Dietz Press 1938).
7 Tucker's Appendix, "the first disquisition upon the character and
interpretation of the Federal Constitution, as well as upon its origin and
true nature," was for years used as a textbook in Virginia and other
states in the early republic. J. Randolph Tucker, The Judges Tucker of
the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1 VA. L. REG. 789, 793-94 (1896); see
Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George Tucker: The American Blackstone, 32
VA. B. NEWS, Feb. 1984, at 45-46.
8 Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47. In 1775, Tucker heard Patrick Henry's
famous "Liberty or Death" speech, and left one of only three detailed
accounts of that debate. TYLER COrT MOSES, PATRICK HENRY 145
(reprinted New York 1980) (1887).
9 COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 35, 48-58. Tucker was appointed major of
the Chesterfield militia, which he led to join General Greene in North
Carolina. With sword and pistol, he dashed about on his horse Hob at
the Battle of Guilford Court House, rallying the wavering militiamen
and taking a bayonet wound in the leg. Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47.
Tucker eventually received a promotion to lieutenant colonel of a troop
of horsemen in the Virginia militia, and was actively involved in the
siege of Yorktown when Cornwallis surrendered. Id.10 Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47.
9
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warm-up for the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which
framed the federal Constitution.11 However, Tucker was
known to have joined with George Mason and Patrick Hen-
ry in opposing its adoption without a bill of rights. 12 In
1788, as the States debated the proposed federal Constitu-
tion, Tucker was appointed judge of the General Court of
Virginia. 13 After serving on the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, 14 President James Madison appointed Tucker United
States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia in
1813.15
In 2006, the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the
William and Mary College of Law held a symposium on
the influence of St. George Tucker on American law.
16
Professor Saul Cornell of Ohio State University presented a
paper on Tucker's views on the right to bear arms.17 As
Cornell notes, "St. George Tucker described the Second
Amendment as 'the true palladium of liberty.""'
8
As the first major commentator on the Constitution,
Tucker's views should be accorded close scrutiny, 19 partic-
ularly on an issue like the Second Amendment, which has
received little attention from the Supreme Court. 20 Profes-
1' Id.
12 Id.; see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (Oct. 24,
1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 279-81 (Boyd ed.,
1955).
13 Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47.
14 See, e.g., Halbrook, supra note 7, at 49.
15 "Biographical Sketch of the Judges of the Court of Appeals," 8 Va.
(4 Call.) 627 (1827).16 Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium: St. George Tucker and His
Influence on American Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 111 (2006).
17 Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Origi-
nal Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1123, 1123 n.* (2006).
18 Id. at 1123; see TUCKER, supra note 2, at 300.
19 "[T]he Supreme Court has cited Tucker in over forty cases." David
B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998
BYUL. REV., 1359, 1376.
20 "Our most recent treatment of the Second Amendment occurred in
10
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sor Cornell has emerged as perhaps the leading exponent of
the view that the Second Amendment recognizes no indi-
vidual right to possess arms, and instead protects a civic
duty to bear arms in the militia. 21 Accordingly, an analysis
of Tucker's views on the issue reveals much of importance
on the Second Amendment, and an analysis of Cornell's
views on Tucker may reveal more about the position that
the Amendment eschews any individual right.
In his article, Cornell seeks to refute "supporters of
gun rights" who misinterpret Tucker as espousing that "the
right to bear arms was originally understood to protect an
individual right to keep and use firearms for personal self-
defense, hunting, and any other lawful activity."22 Refer-
ring to the controversy over "gun rights and gun control,"
Cornell avers, "The individual rights misreading of Tucker
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) .... The Court did not,
however, attempt to define, or otherwise construe, the substantive right
protected by the Second Amendment." Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 938 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring). Only in recent
years has the Second Amendment been accorded detailed scrutiny by
the federal courts of appeals. Compare United States v. Emerson, 270
F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (Second Amendment "protects the rights
of individuals, including those not then actually a member of any
militia... to privately possess and bear their own firearms ...."), cert.
denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002), with Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052,
1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting "the 'collective rights' model, [which]
asserts that the Second Amendment right to 'bear arms' guarantees the
right of the people to maintain effective state militias, but does not
provide any type of individual right to own or possess weapons."),
petition for reh. denied, 328 F.3d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1046 (2003).
21 Cornell is the Director of the Second Amendment Research Center at
the John Glenn Institute, Ohio State University. Cornell, supra note
17, at 1123 n.*- According to the Freedom States Alliance, a firearm
prohibition lobby, Cornell's new book "blows away the NRA myths
about the Second Amendment." (E-mail solicitation from in-
fo@freedomstatesalliance.com, Sept. 19, 2006); see SAUL CORNELL, A
WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS
OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (Oxford University Press 2006).
22 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1123.
11
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is merely the latest example of how constitutional scholar-
ship has been hijacked for ideological purposes in this
bitter debate."
23
I. "THE PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY":
TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE VERSUS CORNELL'S TUCKER
Debunking the individual-rights "hijackers" of the
Second Amendment, Professor Cornell refers to "the often-
quoted passage describing it [the Second Amendment] as
the 'palladium of liberty"' at least five times,' but he
strangely fails to provide the actual quotation or to ac-
knowledge its contents. Providing Tucker's actual quota-
tion or acknowledging its contents would be worthwhile in
order to determine the extent of the constitutional hijacking
by scholars who read the Second Amendment as protecting
individual rights.
After quoting the text of the Amendment, Tucker
began as follows:
This may be considered as the true palla-
dium of liberty .... The right of self defence
is the first law of nature: in most govern-
ments, it has been the study of rulers to con-
fine this right within the narrowest limits
possible. Wherever standing armies are kept
up, and the right of the people to keep and
bear arms is, under any colour or pretext
whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not al-
ready annihilated, is on the brink of destruc-
25tion.
23 Id. at 1124.
24Id. at 1123-25, 1137, 1143.
25 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 300. The above is similar to Tucker's style
in explaining, a few pages earlier, the freedom of the press protected by
the First Amendment as follows:
12
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Cornell's thesis is that Tucker, along with the
Founders in general, saw the Second Amendment as gua-
ranteeing a "state right" to maintain a militia, excluding an
individual right to have and carry arms for self defense,
which the legislature is free to curtail or prohibit. Tucker's
comment, however, clearly espouses the view that the
Second Amendment protects the individual right to bear
arms and to use them for self defense - "the first law of
nature.'26
The above quotation did not mention the militia
although Tucker certainly saw the militia as the republican
alternative to a standing army. After all, the right to arms
for defense extended to protection from both individual
criminals and public tyranny.
Moreover, as noted, Tucker saw any prohibition on
the right "under any colour or pretext whatsoever" as dan-
gerous to liberty. 27 He explained further,
In England, the people have been disarmed,
generally, under the specious pretext of pre-
serving the game: a never failing lure to
bring over the landed aristocracy to support
any measure, under that mask, though calcu-
[A] representative democracy ceases to exist the
moment that the public functionaries are by any
means absolved from their responsibility to their con-
stituents; and this happens whenever the constituent
can be restrained in any manner from speaking, writ-
ing, or publishing his opinions upon any public
measure, or upon the conduct of those who may ad-
vise or execute it.
Id. at 297. The above was quoted in the seminal case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
Justice Black found in Tucker's work "the general view held when the
First Amendment was adopted and ever since." Id. at 296.
26 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 300.
27 Id.
13
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lated for very different purposes. True it is,
their bill of rights seems at first view to
counteract this policy: but the right of bear-
ing arms is confined to protestants, and the
words suitable to their condition and degree,
have been interpreted to authorise the prohi-
bition of keeping a gun or other engine for
the destruction of game, to any farmer, or in-
ferior tradesman, or other person not quali-
fied to kill game. So that not one man in
five hundred can keep a gun in his house
without being subject to a penalty.28
Thus, when explaining how the right to keep and
bear arms was violated in England, Tucker pointed in part
to English game laws that prohibited individuals from
keeping guns, even at home. 29 He said nothing about any
laws that disarmed militias. This silence is inconsistent
with Cornell's thesis that the right to bear arms protects
only militias from being disarmed.
Tucker also referred to the English Declaration of
Rights of 1689, which stated, "That the Subjects which are
Protestants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to
their Conditions, and as allowed by Law." 30 This was a
right of Protestant "Subjects" - not militiamen - to "have
Arms for their Defence," and Tucker referred to this right
as the English variety of "the right of bearing arms" with-
28 Id.
29 Although English game laws were in some cases enforced in a man-
ner to prevent subjects from keeping guns, English judicial precedents
actually held that the people at large could keep arms at home, and that
guns could be seized only when actually being used contrary to the
hunting prohibitions. See Rex v. Gardner, 87 Eng. Rep. 1240 (KB.
1739); STEPHEN HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 51-53
(1984) (analyzing other cases).
30 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 1 W. & M.
2, c. 2 (1689) (Eng.).
14
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out imposing any militia context.
Blackstone had written that "a reason oftener meant,
than avowed, by the makers of forest or game laws" was
"for prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to
the government, by disarming the bulk of the people...
,,31 Historically, conquerors, who founded the European
kingdoms, endeavored "to keep the rustici or natives of the
country.., in as low a condition as possible, and especially
to prohibit them the use of arms. Nothing could do this
more effectually than a prohibition of hunting and sporting
... ,32 Feudal laws thus "prohibit[ed] the rustici in gener-
al from carrying arms" and severely proscribed hunting.
33
Commenting on Blackstone's text, Tucker again
juxtaposed the limited right to have arms under the English
Declaration with the game laws. "In the construction of
these game laws it seems to be held, that no person who is
not qualified according to law to kill game, hath any right
to keep a gun in his house."' 34 Because only persons with
an income of 100 pounds per annum were qualified to hunt,
"it follows that no others can keep a gun for their defence;
so that the whole nation are completely disarmed, and left
at the mercy of the government, under the pretext of pre-
serving the breed of hares and partridges, for the exclusive
use of the independent country gentlemen." 35 Tucker con-
cluded that "[i]n America we may reasonably hope that the
people will never cease to regard the right of keeping and
bearing arms as the surest pledge of their liberty."
36
Again, Tucker discussed the right to keep and bear
arms as protecting the liberty to keep a gun for defense in
the home and to carry arms, including for hunting. No
mention was made of state militia powers or bearing arms
31 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *412 (Tucker ed., 1803).32 Id. at *413.
33 id.
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in a militia. Cornell disregards the above passages alto-
gether.
Although declining to quote the words of Tucker's
"palladium of liberty" text, Cornell notes that Justice Jo-
seph Story used the same allegory in his Commentaries on
the Constitution. Cornell states, "While individual rights
scholars have often cited Story in modern Second Amend-
ment scholarship, they have studiously avoided examining
his own analysis of the original understanding of the
Second Amendment." 37 Cornell proceeds to quote a com-
ment by Justice Story regarding Congress' militia power
being "concurrent with that of the states."
' 38
As with Tucker, Cornell studiously avoids mention
of the content of Story's analysis of the Second Amend-
ment, much less does he quote any of Story's "palladium of
liberty" statement. Story's interpretation is unmistakable:
The right of the citizens to keep, and bear
arms has justly been considered, as the pal-
ladium of the liberties of the republic; since
it offers a strong moral check against usur-
pation and arbitrary power of rulers; and
will generally, even if these are successful in
the first instance, enable the people to resist,
and triumph over them. 
39
Story cited Tucker for that proposition as well as for
the following proposition about the right of subjects "to
37 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1131.
38 Id.
39 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1001, at
708 (1833), citing, inter alia, Tucker, supra note 2, at 300. "Perhaps, at
some future date, this Court will have the opportunity to determine
whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear
arms 'has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a
republic."' Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (citation omitted).
16
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have arms for their defense" under the English Declaration
of Rights: "But under various pretenses the effect of this
provision has been greatly narrowed; and it is at present in
England more nominal than real, as a defensive privi-
lege." 40 Story was referring to possession of arms by indi-
viduals, not by militias. Although Story also stressed the
importance of a well-regulated militia, this view was hardly
inconsistent with the individual right to have arms.
41
Having left the reader in the dark about what Tuck-
er and Story actually said on "the palladium of liberty,"
Cornell asserts that for both, "Protection of states' rights,
not individual rights, was the issue that had prompted the
inclusion of the Second Amendment." 42 Aside from the
constitutional vocabulary that governments (federal and
state) have only "powers" and not "rights," and that only
individuals have "rights,"43 the Second Amendment was
prompted by the perceived need to protect the right of indi-
viduals to keep and bear arms, which would encourage a
well-regulated militia.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To ARMS FOR SELF
DEFENSE?
Blackstone's Commentaries analyzed the right to
have arms in the first chapter, entitled "Of the Absolute
Rights of Individuals," of the first book, entitled "Of the
40 STORY, supra note 39, § 1891 at 747.
41 Elsewhere, Story fused the individual right with the need for a militia
quite neatly as follows: "One of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants
accomplish their purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the
people, and making it an offence to keep arms, and by substituting a
regular army in the stead of a resort to the militia." STORY, A FAMILI-
AR ExPosrrION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 450, at
319 (Regnery Gateway, Inc. 1986) (Harper 1859).
12 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1132.
43 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 and U.S. CONST. amend. X (federal
and state "powers") with U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, IV, and IX
("rights" of the people).
17
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Rights of Persons." Therein he referred to "auxiliary sub-
ordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as
outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the
three great and primary rights, of personal security, person-
al liberty, and private property." 44  Besides the right to
petition, Blackstone included among these auxiliary rights
the following:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the sub-
ject, that I shall at present mention, is that of
having arms for their defence suitable to
their condition and degree, and such as are
allowed by law. Which is also declared by
the same statute 1 W. & M. st. 2 c. 2 [the
Declaration of Rights], and it is indeed, a
public allowance under due restrictions, of
the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation, when the sanctions of society
and laws are found insufficient to restrain
the violence of oppression.
45
To the above, Tucker counterpoised the following:
"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 4, and this without
any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the
case in the British government." 46 Although Cornell refers
to this statement of Tucker, he fails to quote it and asserts
that it does "not address the question of individual self-
defense." 47 Yet the discussion concerns a "right of the
44 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES, *93, *141 (Tucker ed.,
1803).
45 Id. at *144.
46 Id. at * 144 n.40. Tucker referred to the Second Amendment as
Article Four of the Amendments because that was the original number-
ing Congress used when submitting the amendments to the States for
ratification.
47 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1146.
18
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subjects" to use arms for "self-preservation" when the law
is inadequate, and no mention is made of the militia. In-
deed, to Blackstone's above words, Tucker added the fol-
lowing further note:
Whoever examines the forest, and game
laws in the British code, will readily perce-
ive that the right of keeping arms is effec-
tually taken away from the people of
England. The commentator himself informs
us, Vol. II, p. 412, "that the prevention of
popular 'insurrections and resistence to gov-
ernment by disarming the bulk' of the
people, is a reason oftener meant than
avowed by the makers of the forest and
game laws.",
48
Again, the forest and game laws repressed the right
of individuals to keep arms, in order to enable the ruling
monarchy to control the commoners. Such laws had no
applicability to "State's rights" to maintain a militia - in-
deed, England had no States - or to bearing arms in a mili-
tia. Tucker clearly saw the Second Amendment as
prohibiting infringements on the individual right to have
arms.
Contending that the right to have arms in the Eng-
lish Declaration had no self-defense component, Cornell
argues that this auxiliary right, "the right to have arms,"
was aimed at preventing the violence of oppression, not
defending oneself against thieves., 49 But Blackstone made
no distinction between defense against robbers or tyrants,
nor did he limit defense to organized groups and exclude
individual defense. Indeed, the right of having arms vindi-
cated the rights to "personal security" and "personal liber-
48 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *144 n.41.
49 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1146.
19
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ty." As Blackstone further explained,
In these several articles consist the rights, or,
as they are frequently termed, the liberties of
Englishmen . . . . And, lastly, to vindicate
these rights, when actually violated or at-
tacked, the subjects of England are entitled,
in the first place, to the regular administra-
tion and free course of justice in the courts
of law; next, to the right of petitioning the
king and parliament for redress of griev-
ances; and, lastly, to the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and de-
fence.
50
The use of arms "for self-preservation and defense"
could be applied to an individual or a collective group. An
aggressor could be a single murderer or a renegade military
force that stages a coup d' 6tat and overthrows the constitu-
tion. Contrary to Cornell, Blackstone did not limit self-
preservation to some kind of elusive collective right and
eschew individual defense.
Tucker made further references to infringement of
the individual right to bear arms, which Cornell fails to
mention. Tucker explained how the British Parliament
would violate basic rights in the guise of some necessary
objective, but that Congress had no such power. He reite-
rated that in England the game laws "have been converted
into the means of disarming the body of the people," and
that "the acts directing the mode of petitioning parliament,
[sic] and those for prohibiting riots: and for suppressing
assemblies of free-masons, [sic] are so many ways for pre-
venting public meetings of the people to deliberate upon
their public, or national concerns." 51 By contrast, Congress
5 0 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *143-44.
51 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 315.
20
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had "no power to regulate, or interfere with the domestic
concerns, or police of any state.., nor will the constitution
permit any prohibition of arms to the people; or of peacea-
ble assemblies by them, for the purposes whatsoever, and
in any number, whenever they may see occasion."
52
In short, the Bill of Rights precluded "any" ban on
arms "to the people" or of their peaceable assemblies.
Tucker wrote "the people," not "the militia," and he ob-
viously had in mind the rights protected by the First and
Second Amendments.
This pattern is pervasive. Cornell argues that Tuck-
er, in his discussion of the law of treason, sharply con-
trasted "the common law right to keep or carry firearms and
the constitutional right to bear arms" in a militia.53 Regard-
ing the law of treason in England, Sir Matthew Hale ob-
served in Pleas of the Crown that "the very use of weapons
by such an assembly, without the king's licence, unless in
some lawful and special cases, carries a terror with it, and a
presumption of warlike force, &c." 54 Tucker commented
that "[t]he bare circumstance of having arms, therefore, of'
itself, creates a presumption of warlike force in England,
and may be given in evidence there, to prove quo animo the
people are assembled., 55 Cornell acknowledges that state-
ment but then avoids any reference to what Tucker pro-
ceeded to ask:
But ought that circumstance of itself, to
create any such presumption in America,
where the right to bear arms is recognized
and secured in the constitution itself? In
52 1d. at 315-16.
53 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1147.
54 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, Concerning Treason, in 5 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES;
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. B at 19 (1803).
55 Id.
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many parts of the United States, a man no
more thinks, of going out of his house on
any occasion, without his rifle or musket in
his hand, than an European fine gentleman
without his sword by his side.
56
As usual, Cornell avoids the embarrassing quota-
tions. As an example of exercising "the right to bear arms"
as "secured in the constitution," Tucker referred to a man
"going out of his house on any occasion" - not just for a
militia muster - with "his rifle or musket in his hand."
Cornell's veiled reference to the above two sentences revis-
es them to say that, in Tucker's view, "the mere fact of
traveling armed with a musket did not by itself create any
presumption of illegality."
57
Cornell intersperses with the above a discussion of
the prosecutions arising out of the Whisky and Fries rebel-
lions. Cornell states, "The defense and prosecution in the
resulting cases conceded that traveling armed with militia
weapons did not enjoy constitutional protection when those
weapons were used outside of the context of militia-related
activity." 58 He cites a trio of reported cases for that propo-
sition, but these cases do not support this proposition. In
State v. Mitchell,59 the Attorney General argued the unre-
markable proposition that "to assemble in a body, armed
and arrayed, for some treasonable purpose, is an act of
levying war[.],, 60 No one, however, mentioned the consti-
tutional status of traveling with militia arms, whether when
on or off duty.
56 id.
57 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1148-49 n.152.
58 Id. at 1148 (citing United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (Pa. D.
1799); United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 26 F. Cas. 1277
(Pa. D. 1795) (No. 15,788); United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346
(Pa. D. 1795)).
'9 2 U.S. at 348.60Id. at 354.
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III. JUDICIAL REVIEW: INVALIDATING INFRINGEMENTS
ON LIBERTY OR DICTATING TO THE MILITARY
COMMAND?
Cornell's rendition of Tucker is long on Cornell's
characterizations and citations to recent law review articles
supporting the "collective rights" view of the Second
Amendment but woefully short on Tucker's actual words.
This pattern also arises when Cornell discusses Tucker's
views on judicial review. Cornell claims that Tucker con-
jured up a scenario of "federal disarmament of the militia"
in a discussion about whether courts could declare laws
unconstitutional.61
Tucker made no such mention about the militia. In
the reference cited by Cornell, Tucker contended that judi-
cial review is particularly applicable to laws purportedly
passed not under an enumerated power, but under the "ne-
cessary and proper" clause, which violated the Bill of
Rights guarantees. A court may declare a federal criminal
law unconstitutional in the following circumstance:
If, for example, congress were to pass a law
prohibiting any person from bearing arms,
as a means of preventing insurrections, the
judicial courts, under the construction of the
words necessary and proper, here contended
for, would be able to pronounce decidedly
upon the constitutionality of these means.
But if congress may use any means, which
they choose to adopt, the provision in the
constitution which secures to the people the
right of bearing arms, is a mere nullity; and
any man imprisoned for bearing arms under
such an act, might be without relief; because
61 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1138 (citing TUCKER, supra note 2, at
289).
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in that case, no court could have any power
to pronounce on the necessity or propriety of
the means adopted by congress to carry any
specified power into complete effect. 
62
In the above quotation, Tucker referred to a law
prohibiting "any person" - not a militia - from bearing
arms. Judicial review would be initiated by "any man"
imprisoned for bearing arms, rather than a State claiming
federal usurpation of its militia power or an individual
claiming rejection by a militia force. In short, the Second
Amendment protected individuals from federal laws which
would prohibit possession of arms and impose imprison-
ment for having arms.
Tucker expanded on this analysis of judicial protec-
tion for the right to keep and bear arms in a further passage.
Cornell refers to a passage's page number but neither
quotes the passage nor summarizes its content. 63  Tucker
wrote,
If, for example, a law be passed by congress,
prohibiting the free exercise of religion, ac-
cording to the dictates, or persuasions of a
man's own conscience; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people to assemble peaceably, or
62 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 289. Tucker adhered to the then-incipient
view that the courts are duty bound to declare statutes contrary to the
constitution as void. In a General Court case decided in 1793, Judge
Tucker opined that the Virginia Constitution of 1776, being the sove-
reign act of the people and hence the supreme law, "is a rule to all
departments of the government, to the judiciary as well as to the legis-
lature .... " Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20, 23 (Va. Gen. Ct.
1793). Chief Justice John Marshall would espouse that view in Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
63 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1138 (citing TUCKER, supra note 2, at
357).
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to keep and bear arms; it would, in any of
these cases be the province of the judiciary
to pronounce whether any such act were
constitutional, or not; and if not, to acquit
the accused from any penalty which might
be annexed to the breach of such unconstitu-
tional act. . . . The judiciary, therefore, is
that department of the government to whom
the protection of the rights of the individual
is by the constitution especially confided, in-
terposing it's shield between him and the
sword of usurped authority, the darts of op-
pression, and the shafts of faction and vi-
olence.
64
The right to have arms, under the above view, was
on par with freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, and
abridgment of any of these rights should be declared un-
constitutional. The judiciary had a special responsibility to
protect these "rights of the individual."
Cornell, who refuses to quote the relevant passages,.
refers to "The modem individual rights misreading of
Tucker," and asserts, "[t]he danger that Tucker appre-
hended was federal disarmament of the state militias."
65
He adds, "If Federalists tried to restrict the right to bear
arms in the militia, Tucker believed that federal courts
should strike down such laws as unconstitutional."' 66 Tuck-
er, however, never mentioned the militia in the above pas-
sages, not even once.
As for the alleged "right to bear arms in the militia,"
those conscripted into the militia apparently have a "right"
to do that which they are ordered to do on pain of fines or
imprisonment. It is a rather curious "right" to do some-
64 Tucker, supra note 2, at 357.
65 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1139.
66 Id. at 1139-40.
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thing one is forced to do. As for those who are not con-
scripted into the militia, they have an even more radical
"right" to be so conscripted.
Specifically, based on the same passage from Tuck-
er quoted above, Cornell asserts that to Tucker "the right to
bear arms in a well-regulated militia was a judicially enfor-
ceable privilege and immunity of federal citizenship."
' 67
Aside from the fact that Tucker did not say or even imply
that, the implications of this statement are astonishing. It
suggests that a person who is not a member of a militia
could file a federal lawsuit and obtain a judicial decree
ordering those in authority to accept such person as a mili-
tia member and further ordering that such person be able to
bear arms. Could such person also choose which arm he or
she would like to bear, as well as decide where and when to
do so? Such a doctrine is inconsistent with the fundamental
concept of compelled enrollment into a military force and
its system of command.
Tucker himself noted that the 1792 Militia Act
"establishing an uniform militia throughout the United
States, seems to have excluded all but free white men from
bearing arms in the militia." 68 Indeed, the Act provided in
67 Id. at 1126 (citing Tucker, supra note 2, at 356-57). Cornell claims
that this view was adopted by Republicans in the Department of Justice
during Reconstruction, but only cites two works supportive of the view
that Reconstruction Republicans held the Second Amendment to be a
right of individuals, including freed slaves, which was incorporated
against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 257-66 (1998);
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 viii (1998). The Depart-
ment pursued criminal indictments in federal courts alleging that the
individual rights of freedmen to assemble and to have arms under the
First and Second Amendments were violated by private conspirators.
See HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, chapters 6-7.
68 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, in 2
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, app. H at 37 n. Elsewhere, Tucker
summarized the militia law in part as follows:
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part that "each and every free able-bodied white male citi-
zen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall
be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-
five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall several-
ly and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain
or commanding officer of the company, within whose
bounds such citizen shall reside . .,,69 Even within that
limited class, various occupations, from government offi-
cials to persons involved in crucial transportation services,
were exempt from the militia.7 °
According to the Cornell thesis, the people not
qualified by law to be in the militia because of age, sex,
race, occupation, not being able-bodied, or simply not be-
ing needed had a judicially enforceable right under the
Second Amendment to enlist in the militia so that they
could "bear arms." The above statutory limitations pre-
sumably should have been declared unconstitutional by the
courts.
Moreover, the Act also required every person
enrolled in the militia to "provide himself with a good
musket or firelock," as well as other equipment, and re-
quired him to "appear, so armed, accoutered and provided,.
when called out to exercise, or into service .... ,"71 Under
Every able bodied white male citizen of the respec-
tive states, of the age of eighteen, and under forty-
five years of age (except certain persons particularly
excepted, and all persons who now are, or may be
excepted by the laws of the respective states) shall be
enrolled in the militia: and every person so enrolled
shall, within six months, provide himself with arms,
&c. as directed by the act, and shall appear so armed,
&c. when called out to exercise, or into service. Id.
at 409 n.
69 Act of May 8, 1792, ch.33, §1, 1 Stat. 271, 271 (1792).
70 id. § 2.
71 id. § 1.
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the Cornellian constitutional right to bear arms in the mili-
tia, however, one not called out to exercise or into service
would have a judicially enforceable right to be called out to
the militia. Such person would also presumably have the
right to decide what kind of arms to bear, even if contrary
to what the law and the militia command prescribed.
In short, Cornell is so intent on deconstructing the
ordinary reading of the Second Amendment - that the
people have a right to keep and bear arms - that he conjures
up the unprecedented fantasy that a federal court could
dictate to military authorities, including the personnel of a
militia force together with their functions and arms. Reali-
ty was and remains otherwise. A militiaman's refusal to
peel potatoes when so commanded because he felt entitled
to "bear arms" would be insubordination - not the exercise
of a constitutional right - and could lead to a court-martial.
Tucker's views, as expressed in his edition of
Blackstone, were originally formulated in his law lectures
presented at the William and Mary College of Law. These
lectures, according to Cornell, do "not support the individ-
ual rights view," and Tucker "explicitly described the
Second Amendment as a right of the states ... ."" For
once, Cornell presents an actual quotation from Tucker,
instead of the usual snippet or failure to quote anything. In
this quotation, Tucker states that a State may choose "to
incur the expence of putting arms into the Hands of its own
Citizens for their defense," and that would not "contra-
vene" federal authority.73 "[T]o contend that such a power
would be dangerous" - on the basis that federal law might
be resisted or withdrawal from the Union might occur -
"would be subversive of every principle of Freedom in our
Government." 74 Tucker added that this quotation was the
view of the first federal Congress because it proposed what
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became the Second Amendment, which Tucker quotes.
"To this we may add that this power of arming the militia,
is not one of those prohibited to the States by the Constitu-
tion, and, consequently, is reserved to them under the
[Tenth Amendment].
This statement is consistent with both the power of
the state to arm its citizens, which is implied in both the
Militia Clause of the Second Amendment and in the re-
served powers guarantee of the Tenth Amendment, and the
right of the citizens to keep and bear such arms, which is
explicit in the Second Amendment's operative clause. In
short, the states had a reserved power to arm the militia,
and this reservation did not violate any power delegated to
the federal government. Contrary to Cornell, Tucker did
not assert that the Second Amendment secures nothing
more than a state militia power.
Tucker's above views from his law lectures reap-
peared in his View of the Constitution, which was published
as an appendix to his edition of Blackstone. The subject
was the Militia Power in Article I, Section 8 of the Consti-
tution, which delegates power to Congress "[t]o provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respec-
tively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority
of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress. ,76
The objective of this provision, according to Tuck-
er, could be traced to the Virginia Bill of Rights, which
declared "that a well-regulated militia, composed of the
body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural,
75 Id. at 1130. Indeed, the Constitution was clear when it prohibited
military powers to the States. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No
State shall.., keep Troops... in time of Peace").
76 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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and safe defence of a free state ... ... Tucker recalled the
proposed amendment by the Virginia Convention that rati-
fied the Constitution in 1788: "that each state respectively
should have the power to provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress
should omit or neglect to provide for the same."'78 (As
discussed below, that provision was rejected by Congress
when it considered amendments in 1789.) Any "uneasiness
upon the subject, seems to be completely removed," Tucker
continued, by the Second Amendment. 79 "To which we
may add, that the power of arming the militia, not being
prohibited to the states, respectively, by the constitution, is,
consequently, reserved to them, concurrently with the fed-
eral government."
80
The above was consistent with Tucker's other
comments in the View on the Second Amendment. Recog-
nition of the right of the people to have arms promoted a
well-regulated militia. Contrary to Cornell, the two con-
cepts are hardly irreconcilable.
As noted above, the Virginia Convention proposed
a state power to provide for the militia should Congress
neglect to do so. This was among the structural amend-
ments concerning federal and state powers that the conven-
tion proposed. Virginia also proposed an entirely separate
list of "unalienable rights," including "[t]hat the people
have a right to freedom of speech," and "[t]hat the people
77 Tucker, supra note 2, at 273 (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights,
Art. XIff (1776)).
78 Id.; see 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 660 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1836) [hereinafter 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CON-
VENTIONS].79 Tucker, supra note 2, at 273.
80 d. The focus of Tucker's discussion was the Militia Power, not the
Second Amendment, which was mentioned only once. Id. at 273.
Cornell cites these same pages and claims: "This discussion of the
Second Amendment clearly frames the issue in terms of the militia."
Cornell, supra note 17, at 1138.
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have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated
militia, composed of the body of the people trained to arms,
is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state...
,,81
When the first federal Congress considered amend-
ments to the Constitution, the proposed bill of rights was
considered separately from the structural amendments. The
Senate passed provisions, which would become the First
and Second Amendments, rejecting inclusion of an anti-
standing army provision in the latter.82 St. George Tucker
was informed of these Senate proceedings.
83
The Senate considered separately, and rejected, all
structural amendments to the Constitution, including the
Virginia proposal: "That each state, respectively, shall
have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall
omit or neglect to provide for the same .... 84 The lin-
guistic differences are unmistakable: this posited the
"power" of the "state" to organize, arm, and discipline its
militia, in contrast with the "right" of "the people" to keep
and bear arms.
John Randolph wrote to St. George Tucker about
the Senate action as follows: "A majority of the Senate
were for not allowing the militia arms & if two thirds had-
agreed it would have been an amendment to the Constitu-
tion. They are afraid that the Citizens will stop their full
81 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note
78, at 659.82 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 70-71 (Gales & Seaton 1820) [hereinafter JOUR-
NAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE].
83 Letter from Theodorick Bland Randolph to St. George Tucker (Sept.
9, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY
RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, at 293 (Helen E. Veit et
al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
14 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE, supra note 82, at
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career to Tyranny & Oppression."
85
Cornell, without any reference to the Senate's con-
sideration of the amendment regarding the State militia
power, mistakes Randolph's letter as concerning the
Second Amendment, and asserts: "As Randolph's letter to
Tucker suggests, the issue before the Senate was control of
the militia, not an individual right to use guns for personal
defense or hunting."86 Yet the Senate passed the individual
right to have arms and rejected the state power to maintain
militias. It cannot be the case that, by declaring the right of
the people to keep and bear arms, Congress actually in-
tended to declare the power of States to maintain militias -
the very proposal Congress rejected.
The Senate then returned to the bill of rights, pass-
ing a form of the First Amendment similar to the final ver-
sion, and rejecting a proposal to add "for the common
defence" after "bear arms" in the Second Amendment.
87
Had it succeeded, recognition of "the right of the people to
keep and bear arms for the common defense" would have
still guaranteed an individual right to keep arms, but could
have been interpreted as allowing arms to be borne only for
the common defense.
Cornell denies that the Senate's rejection of the
words "bear arms for the common defense" "establishes
that they intended to protect an individual right," claiming
that "Randolph's letter casts the choice to excise this lan-
guage in a radically different light.",88 To the contrary,
Senate action on the Second Amendment was entirely sepa-
rate from its action on the State militia power, which was
the subject of Randolph's letter. 89
85 Letter from John Randolph to St. George Tucker (Sept. 11, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 83, at 293.
86 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1129. Strangely, Cornell describes the
Senate action as a defeat, rather than a victory, for the Federalists. Id.
87 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE, supra note 82, at 77.
88 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1129 (citations omitted).
89 Cornell makes a single oblique reference to the failed State-militia-
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IV. TiE LINGUISTICS OF "BEARING ARMS":
"BEAR" DOES NOT MEAN CARRY, AND "ARMS" DOES
NOT MEAN HANDGUNS
Under Tucker's above linguistic usage, the term
"bear arms" simply means to carry a weapon, whether for
defense, hunting, militia purposes, or other reasons. How-
ever, Cornell argues that "bear arms" had an almost exclu-
sively military usage. 90 The evidence for this argument is
underwhelming.
The first state bill of rights to use the term "bear
arms" was that of Pennsylvania in 1776, which stated,
"That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence
of themselves and the state . ,91 Cornell denies that
such language denotes an individual right, since it did not
refer to the singular "right to bear arms in defense of him-
self and the State," as did one or more state bills of rights in
the nineteenth century. 92  Yet "defense of themselves"
power amendment, yet endeavors to attribute its meaning to the Second
Amendment: "Anti-Federalists failed to obtain their primary goal of
securing structural amendments to the Constitution that would have
shifted power back to the [S]tates.... Although an amendment restrict-
ing federal control over the militia was rejected, the adoption of the
Second Amendment was understood, at least by some, to provide some
protection for the state militias." Id. at 1133 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1140-44.
91 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights art. XIII (1776). Ignoring this
guarantee, Cornell asserts, "A few efforts had been made to incorporate
this common law principle [to bear a gun in self-defense] into state bills
of rights during the Founding Era, but those efforts inevitably failed."
Cornell, supra note 17, at 1144. His only example is that the Virginia
Declaration of Rights did not include Jefferson's proposal that "[N]o
freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms ... ." Id. (citing THO-
MAS JEFFERSON, The Virginia Constitution, First Draft (1776), in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THoMAS JEFFERSON 329, 344 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton
University Press 1950)). Actually, none of Jefferson's draft bill of
rights was included.
92 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1141. The first constitution to use the
phrase "defense of himself and the State" was the Mississippi Constitu-
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meant self defense, otherwise, it would redundantly mean
"defense of the state."
Moreover, Pennsylvania kept that same clause in a
1790 revision as follows: "That the right of the citizens to
bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not
be questioned." 93 James Wilson, president of the conven-
tion that adopted the provision, a leading Federalist, and
later Supreme Court Justice, explained the guarantee in a
discussion of homicide "when it is necessary for the de-
fence of one's person or house." 94 He continued,
[I]t is the great natural law of self-
preservation, which, as we have seen, cannot
be repealed, or superseded, or suspended by
any human institution. This law, however,
is expressly recognised in the constitution of
Pennsylvania. "The right of the citizens to
bear arms in the defence of themselves shall
not be questioned." This is one of our many
renewals of the Saxon regulations. "They
were bound," says Mr. Selden, "to keep
arms for the preservation of the kingdom,
and of their own persons."
95
Cornell argues that only "isolated examples" exist
of the phrase "bear arms" used in an individual, non-
military sense, "an idiosyncratic text such as the Dissent of
tion. See MIss. CONST. art. L § 23 (1817).93 PA. CONST. art. IX, § XXI (1790).
94 3 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON
84 (Lorenzo Press 1804).
95 Id. (citations omitted); see Nathaniel Bacon, An Historical and Polit-
ical Discourse of the Laws and Government of England, in 1 COL-
LECTED FROM SOME MANUSCRIPT NomS OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 40 (D.
Browne & A. Millar 1760) ("Freemen... were bound to keep Arms for
the preservation of the Kingdom, their Lords, and their own persons").
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the Pennsylvania Minority" being one example.9 6  The
Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority was a proposal by
Anti-Federalists in the Pennsylvania convention that rati-
fied the Constitution in 1787 for a bill of rights, including
the following:
That the people have a right to bear arms for
the defense of themselves and their own
state, or the United States, or for the purpose
of killing game; and no law shall be passed
for disarming the people or any of them, un-
less for crimes committed, or real danger of
public injury from individuals .... 97
When the Bill of Rights was being debated in the
House of Representatives in 1789, Representative Frede-
rick A. Muhlenberg, who was then the Speaker of the
House and had also been president of the Pennsylvania
Ratification Convention, wrote, "[I]t takes in the principal
Amendments which our Minority had so much at Heart...
,98 The Second Amendment was merely a more concise
version of the above, sans its laundry list of purposes and
exceptions.
Cornell cites no proposed or adopted constitutional
guarantee that limited the terms "bear arms" as a "right" for
purely military use. He refers to a game bill that Jefferson
drafted and that Madison proposed to the Virginia legisla-
ture in 1785. 99 The bill provided for deer hunting seasons
outside one's enclosed land, punishing a violator with a
fine, and being bound to his good behavior. If within a
96 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1140 n.103.
97 2 TiE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION 623-24 (Merrill Jensen ed., State Historical Society of Wis-
consin 1976).
98 Letter from Frederick A. Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush (Aug. 18,
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 83, at 280.
99 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1141.
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year "he shall bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless
whilst performing military duty," the defendant would be in
violation of his recognizance. 100 Because this bill refers to
"bear[ing]" an arm when deer hunting or otherwise not on
military duty, Cornell's claim that "this text undermines the
claims of individual rights theorists" is difficult to under-
stand. 101
While ignoring Tucker's repeated use of "bear
arms" above to refer to individual use, Cornell points to
Tucker's work on slavery to show that the term "bear arms"
was "a legal term of art that clearly implied the use of arms
in a public capacity, not a private one."1 02 Writing in 1796,
Tucker noted that free Negroes "were formerly incapable of
serving in the militia, except as drummers or pioneers, but
now I presume they are enrolled in the lists of those that
bear arms, though formerly punishable for presuming to
appear at a muster-field." 10 3 Tucker republished his essay
on slavery in the Commentaries with new notations, includ-
ing the following in regard to the comment that free blacks
were enrolled in the militia: "This was the case under the
laws of the state; but the act of 2 Cong. c. 33, for establish-
ing an uniform militia throughout the United States, seems
to have excluded all but free white men from bearing arms
in the militia."
' 10 4
Despite the military assistance of free blacks and
even slaves in the Revolution, they were deprived of civil
rights, such as, "All but housekeepers, and persons residing
upon the frontiers are prohibited from keeping, or carrying
any gun, powder, shot, club, or other weapon offensive or
100 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Billfor Preservation of Deer, in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 443-44 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
101 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1141.
102Id. at 1142.
103 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY: WITH A PRO-
POSAL FOR THE GRADUAL ABOLITION OF IT, IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
20 (Philadelphia 1796).104 TUCKER, supra note 68, at 37 n.
36
3:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 150
defensive."
' 10 5
Tucker referred above to free blacks, who were
enrolled on the militia lists to "bear arms," as well as the
later exclusion of all but whites "from bearing arms in the
militia." In neither instance did he limit the term "bear
arms" to militia service, and in the latter, he specified that
the bearing of arms was "in the militia." Tucker used the
terms in the broadest manner in his plan for the emancipa-
tion of slaves, in which he proposed civil restrictions such
as, "Let no Negroe or mulattoe be capable ... of keeping,
or bearing arms, unless authorised so to do by some act of
the general assembly . .,106 He explained that "by dis-
arming them, we may calm our apprehensions of their re-
sentments arising from past sufferings ... .,, 107
Referring to the above prohibition on blacks "keep-
ing, or bearing arms," Cornell claims: "According to Tuck-
er's analysis, blacks would be prohibited from keeping
arms in their home, or from appearing at muster and being
105 TUCKER, supra note 103, at 20. Tucker also referred to the Virginia
act of 1680, renewed in 1705 and 1792, which "prohibited slaves from
carrying any club, staff, gun, sword, or other weapon, offensive or
defensive. This act was afterwards extended to all Negroes, mulattoes
and Indians whatsoever, with a few exceptions in favor of housekee-
pers, residents on a frontier plantation, and such as were enlisted in the
militia." Id. at 55. He noted about such laws the following: "From this
melancholy review it will appear that.., even the right of personal
security, has been, at times, either wholly annihilated, or reduced to a
shadow." Id. at 57.
106 TUCKER, supra note 103, at 93. Tucker added in a footnote to the
above: "See Spirit of Laws, 12, 15, 1. Blackst. Com. 417." Id. In that
passage, Blackstone relied on Montesquieu for the proposition that
slaves, excluded from liberty, envy and hate the rest of the community,
and thus warned "not to intrust those slaves with arms; who will then
find themselves an overmatch for the freemen." BLACKSTONE, supra
note 31, at *417-18. Montesquieu warned of "the danger of arming
slaves is not so great in monarchies as in republics." 1 BARON DE
MONTESQUiEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 243 (Thomas Nugent transl.,
1899).
107 TUCKER, supra note 103, at 95.
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issued arms they might bear as part of the militia."' 08 Yet
Tucker said nothing about any militia muster or being is-
sued arms - the prohibition was on "bearing arms" in any
form, which meant carrying arms in any manner, just as
under the slave codes.
In explaining the term "bear arms," Cornell not only
constricts the word "bear" to one narrow meaning, but also
does the same with the word "arms." Militia weapons such
as muskets were constitutionally protected (albeit limited to
militia use), while "civilian firearms," "ordinary guns," and
"personal arms such as pistols" were not. 109
However, pistols were indeed militia arms. Officers
in troops with horses were required by the 1792 Militia Act
to "be armed with a sword and pair of pistols."' 110 Tucker
himself fought in battles in the Revolution as a militia of-
ficer armed with sword and pistol.1 1' Not surprisingly,
Cornell finds nothing to cite from Tucker to substantiate his
claim.
Instead, Cornell quotes from an anonymous letter to
the editor writing on the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 to the effect that "the legislature have [sic] a power to
controul [arms] in all cases, except the one mentioned in
the bill of rights . .,,112 Cornell adds, implying that he is
summarizing the author, "Personal arms such as pistols
were not treated in the same way as militia weapons such
as muskets." 113 Yet the author said absolutely nothing
about that subject. "In the absence of any law prohibiting
the ownership or use of personal firearms" - Cornell's
words, not the author's - "'the people still enjoy, and must
continue so to do till the legislature shall think fit to inter-
108 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1142.
' 9Id. at 1151.
110 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 stat. 272 § 4.
111 Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47.
112 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1151 (quoting Scribble Scrabble, CUM-
BERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Maine), Dec. 8, 1786).
113 id.
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Moreover, the context of the above was the Massa-
chusetts Constitution, which provided, "The people have a
right to keep and bear arms for the common defence."
115
The above author commented elsewhere, "All men ... have
... a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense,
to kill game, fowl .... The [Massachusetts] Bill of Rights
secures to the people the use of arms in common defence;
so that, if it be an alienable right, one use of arms is secured
to the people against any law of the legislature."' 116 The
federal Second Amendment includes no limitation on the
use of arms to the common defense, a clause which - as
discussed above - was explicitly rejected.
Running far a field of Tucker, Cornell also refer-
ences an 1837 Georgia law that prohibited the sale and
possession of pistols. 117 He neglects to mention that the
Georgia Supreme Court declared that law unconstitutional
under the Second Amendment, explaining that
The right of the whole people, old and
114 Id. (quoting Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland,
Maine), Jan. 26, 1786). Another author writing in the same newspaper
noted, "The idea that Great Britain meant to take away their arms, was
fresh in the minds of the people; therefore in forming a new govern-
ment, they wisely guarded against it." Senex, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE
(Portland, Maine), Jan. 12, 1787. This contradicts Cornell's thesis that
pistols were not constitutionally protected, since British General Tho-
mas Gage confiscated pistols as well as other firearms from the inhabi-
tants of Boston. RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, HISTORY OF THE SIEGE OF
BOSTON 95 (Little Brown & Co. 1903) ("[T]he people delivered to the
selectmen 1778 fire-arms, 634 pistols, 973 bayonets, and 38 blunder-
busses"). In the Declaration of Causes of Taking Up Arms of July 6,
1775, the Continental Congress decried Gage's seizure of the arms of
the people of Boston. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774-1779, 151 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed. 1905).
115 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, art. XVII (1780).
116 Scribble-Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Maine), Jan.
26, 1787.
117 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1151 n.165.
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young, men, women and boys, and not mili-
tia only, to keep and bear arms of every de-
scription, and not such merely as are used by
the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed,
or broken in upon, in the smallest degree;
and all this for the important end to be at-
tained: the rearing up and qualifying a well-
regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the
security of a free State. Our opinion is, that
any law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the
Constitution, and void, which contravenes
this right ... 118
That interpretation is consistent with Tucker's re-
mark that liberty is endangered where "the right of the
people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext
whatsoever, prohibited . *.". ." ' Aside from the fact that
pistols were militia arms, Tucker's statements against the
English game laws demonstrate that firearms in general,
including hunting arms, were constitutionally protected.
Tucker contrasted the rights of Americans under the
Second Amendment with England, where "the people have
been disarmed, generally," so that "not one man in five
hundred can keep a gun in his house .... ,,120
CONCLUSION
Cornell asserts that Tucker's "writings fit neither
the modern collective nor individual rights models. In his
more mature writings, Tucker thus approached the right to
bear arms as both a right of the states and as a civic
right." 121  Aside from that not being Tucker's approach,
118 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846).
119 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 300.
120 Id.
121 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1126.
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that is the "collective rights" model. Denial that a "right" is
individual necessarily implies that it is "collective." The
ideas of a state "right" to bear arms and of a person's "civic
right" to bear arms in the militia are two basic variants of
the collective rights model.
Having turned Tucker completely on his head, Cor-
nell expresses indignation about scholars who read Tuck-
er's words in their literal and ordinary way,
Far too much scholarly energy has been
wasted in the great American gun debate
trying to twist history to produce a usable
past. While both sides in this debate have
played the law office history game on occa-
sion, partisans of the individual-rights view
have been far more aggressive in pushing
their ideological agenda. . . . Reinterpreting
the Second Amendment as an individual
right does more than simply distort history
for ideological purposes, it also does great
violence to the text of the Constitution ...
122
Although Cornell is certainly correct in adding that
one cannot erase the Militia Clause from the text, one also
may not erase the substantive right. Those who deny that
the Second Amendment protects individual rights have
failed to articulate any inconsistency between recognition.
of the right of the populace to have arms and the resultant
encouragement of a militia.
The irony cannot be lost that Tucker, in his lectures
at William and Mary College of Law, explained the ramifi-
cations of the Second Amendment as an individual right in
detail, and that two centuries later, at the same College of
Law, in a symposium dedicated to Tucker's legacy, his
122/d. at 1154.
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views on the Second Amendment were obliterated. This
obliteration is accomplished by repeated veiled references
to "the often-quoted passage describing it [the Second
Amendment] as 'the true palladium of liberty,"'' 123 without
ever quoting that passage or any of the other rich passages
in which Tucker analyzed the broad character of the right to
keep and bear arms.
That brings us back to Tucker's insight that a bill of
rights is intended not only to instruct government on its
limits, but also to "giv[e] information to the people."'
124
Every person, even the most humble, therefore "may learn
his own rights, and know when they are violated .... ,125
Tucker synthesized the Founders' aspirations in favor of a
declaration of rights that was more than a scrap of paper.
This was the vision of the Founders with respect to every
provision of the Bill of Rights, not excluding the Second
Amendment.
121Id. at 1123-25, 1137, 1143.
124 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 308.
125 id.
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In 2005, the Tennessee Legislature passed a law
that granted the Tennessee Department of Revenue (herei-
nafter TDOR) the authority to levy a tax on unauthorized
substances.1 This law requires drug dealers to pay a tax
based on the type and amount of unauthorized substance
they possess. 2 Following payment of the tax, the TDOR
issues the drug dealer a tax stamp that must be attached to
the "unauthorized substances to indicate payment." 3  A
drug dealer arrested for possession of an unauthorized sub-
stance, absent an affixed tax stamp, faces not only criminal
prosecution for the possession of the substance, but also an
assessment of the tax, a penalty, and interest accrued on the
unpaid tax.4 The legislative purpose of this tax is to "gen-
erate revenue for state and local law enforcement agen-
cies."
5
Opponents of illegal drug taxes fear that the imposi-
tion of these taxes infringes upon federal constitutional
rights. The most prevalent arguments arise from the taxes'
inherent problems with the rights against self-incrimination
1 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 803. A tax on narcotics may be referred to as an
"illegal drug tax," "controlled substance tax," or an "unauthorized
substance tax."
2 TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2803 (2006).
3 d. § 67-4-2805.
4 d. § 67-4-2807.
5 /d. § 67-4-2801; see also id. § 67-4-2809(b)(2) (dispensing 75% of
the revenue to the local governments and the remaining 25% of the
revenue to the state's general fund).
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and double jeopardy. 6 A weaker argument may be made
that a person who discharges a tax obligation should have
the legal right to execute the activity associated with that
tax. 7
A Tennessee Chancery Court struck down Tennes-
see's unauthorized substance tax as unconstitutional. 8
Davidson County Chancellor Richard Dinkins ruled that
the tax violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the right
against self-incrimination. 9 This ruling, however, was only
applicable to Jeremy Robbins, who was arrested on federal
drug charges and then ordered to pay the unauthorized
substance tax.10 Chancellor Dinkins found that "levying
the tax and charging someone with a crime was equivalent
to double jeopardy... ," and "buying the stamps violated a
person's right to avoid self-incrimination.""I
The Tennessee Court of Appeals for the Eastern
Section also found that Tennessee's unauthorized substance
tax was unconstitutional. 12  Rather than finding the tax
unconstitutional on federal constitutional grounds, the court
looked to the Tennessee Constitution.13 The Court deter-
mined that the tax was in essence a privilege tax allowable
under the Tennessee Constitution Article II, Section 28.14
6 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
... 1 ).
7 But see § 67-4-28 10.
8 Sheila Burke, Judge Overturns Illicit-Drugs Tax, THE TENNESSEAN,
July 12, 2006, at 1A.
9 Id. Chancellor Dinkins also ruled that Tennessee's unauthorized
substance tax violated substantive due process because the law was
invalid on its face. See id.
101Id.
11 Id.
12 Waters v. Chumley, No. E2006-02225-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL
2500370, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2007).
13 Id. at *1.
14Id. at *2.
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For this reason, the tax was deemed subject to the limita-
tion that it "must not be arbitrary, capricious or wholly
unreasonable." 15 Consequently, since "[t]axation of [a]
privilege is ... carried on ...under protection of the
state," 16 and the tax is levied on "an activity the Legislature
has previously declared to be a crime, not a privilege," the
court concluded the tax was "arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable .... ,,17
Taxes on unauthorized substances have not been
enacted in every state. Thus far, twenty-seven states have
at some point enacted a tax on illegal drugs. 18 State legisla-
tures that have not passed a tax on illegal drugs are now
examining the benefits of taxing narcotics. More specifi-
cally, these states are interested in the revenue raising ca-
pability of taxing the illegal drug trade. Many state
15 Id. (citing Hooten v. Carson, 209 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tenn. 1948))
16 Id. at *3 (citing Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, 260
S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tenn. 1924)).
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-17A-1 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
12-651(a) (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-15-1 (West 2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 63-4201 (2006); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/1 (West
2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-1 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. §
453B (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5201 (2005); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 138.870 (West 2006); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:2601
(West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64K § 1 (West 2006); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 297D.01 (West 2006); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-4301
(2006); NEv. REv. STAT. § 372A.070 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
105-113.107 (LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 618, § 450.1 (West
2006); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7204(17) (West 2006) (used in
Zimmerman v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 449 A.2d 103 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982) to tax illegal drugs); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-
2803 (West 2006); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 159.201 (Vernon 2006);
UTAH CODE ANN. §59-19-101 (West 2006); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 139.88
(West 2006) (found unconstitutional by State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778
(Wis. 1989)); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1203.01D (West 1990)
(repealed 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-28.7-101 (West 2006)
(repealed 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.0505 (West 2006) (repealed
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-101 (2006) (repealed 1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 7-18A-1 (West 2006) (repealed 1995).
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legislatures have also enacted illegal drug taxes because
drug dealers acquire large sums of tax-free money. 19 Re-
gardless of the motive, illegal drug taxes provide many
states with the machinery to generate revenue on illegal
commercial activity that would otherwise be excluded from
assessment.
20
Many law-abiding, tax-paying citizens may agree
with a tax on illegal drugs because of their belief that indi-
viduals involved in the illegal drug trade should contribute
to the tax burden placed on society. Despite these opinions,
the issues that arise from taxing the illegal drug trade-the
inherent problems with constitutional safeguards and the
effectiveness of obtaining tax revenue-should cause pub-
lic apprehension.
First, this Note will provide a brief synopsis of the
evolution of illegal drug taxes and discuss Tennessee's
interest in using an illegal drug tax to assist in the war on
drugs. Next, this Note will describe, specifically, the oper-
ation of Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax. In con-
clusion, this Note will examine the effects that illegal drug
taxes have on the constitutional privileges against self-
incrimination and double jeopardy, noting that the State of
Tennessee has not streamlined a collection process for its
unauthorized substance tax.
II. CREATION OF ILLEGAL DRUG TAXES
Illegal drug taxes have their origins in federal legis-
lation and the United States' authority to lay taxes and
regulate commerce. The Constitution gives the federal
government the ability "[to] lay and collect [t]axes" and
"[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States...
19 Christian D. Stewart, Double Jeopardy - State Drug Tax Statutes Go
up in Smoke: Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994), 74 NEB. L. REv. 221, 226 (1995).20Id. at 227.
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,,21 In 1864, Congress used this power to enact legislation
that required people involved in the business of selling
lottery tickets or liquor to obtain a license from the federal
government. 22 In the License Tax Cases, seven separate
defendants from various states contested their convictions
for non-payment of the lottery and liquor licenses. 23 The
defendants challenged whether they could be convicted for
non-payment of the lottery and liquor licenses, even though
the laws of their states prohibited these activities. 24 The
Supreme Court held that the licenses were a "mere form of
imposing a tax," and "it [was] not necessary to regard these
laws as giving such authority" to conduct these business-
es. 25 This decision provided an avenue for state legislatures
to tax illegal drugs while maintaining that payment of the
tax had no bearing on the illegality of the drug.
Years after the Supreme Court's decision in the
License Tax Cases, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of
1913.26 This law levied a tax on income from any "lawful
business. ' 27  The subsequent Revenue Act of 1916 re-
moved the word "lawful" from the previous Revenue Act.
28
The removal of the word "lawful" implied that "illegal
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI
("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.")
(emphasis added).
22 United States v. Vassar (License Tax Cases), 72 U.S. 462, 463
(1866).
23 Id. at 464.
24 Id. at 464-65.
25 Id. at 471; see also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44
(1968) (noting that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly indicated that
the unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its taxation ....
26 Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913)
(amended 1916).
27 Id. § 2B, 38 Stat. at 167; see also Frank A. Racaniello, State Drug
Taxes: A Tax We Can't Afford, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 657, 658 (1992).
28 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757
(1916).
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businesses" were now required to identify themselves for
tax purposes. 29  Consequently, this Act may be read to
require people involved in the illegal drug trade to report
their income to the federal government for tax purposes.
The first federal laws that imposed a tax specifically
on narcotics were the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 191430
and the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.31 These laws did not
explicitly outlaw any substances, but instead made it illegal
to transfer certain substances without payment of a tax.
32
Nevertheless, the high rate of tax imposed by these acts
may have had a profound deterring effect that likely contri-
buted to the eventual outlaw of the substances covered
under each act.
33
Although these laws may have assisted the federal
government in its growing fight with the war on drugs, the
Marijuana Tax Act was later found unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court in Leary v. United States.
34
The Leary decision may have initially prevented states
from enacting their own illegal drug taxes. Nonetheless,
"[i]n 1983, Arizona became the first state" to levy a tax on
illegal drugs. 35 Other states soon followed, resulting in the
29 Eric J. Dimbeck, The Supreme Court Confiscates an Unjust Weapon
Used in the "War on Drugs": Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 353, 354 (1996).30 Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)
(this act placed a tax on opiates and coca leaves, which are used in the
groduction of cocaine).
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-237, 50 Stat. 551 (1937)
(repealed 1970).
See id.; Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38
Stat. 785; see also Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decri-
minalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 501, 508 (1990).
33 For example, people who did not pay the marijuana tax were obli-
gated to pay $100 per ounce per transfer and $2,000 for any violation
of the act. Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-237, 50 Stat.
554-56 (repealed 1970).
34 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 53-54 (1969).
35 Christina Joyce, Expanding the War Against Drugs: Taxing Mariju-
ana and Controlled Substances, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 231
49
3:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 163
present day number of twenty-seven states that have
enacted some form of an illegal drug tax.
3 6
III. TENNESSEE'S INTEREST IN ENACTING AN
ILLEGAL DRUG TAx
Senator Randy McNally (R-Oak Ridge) sponsored
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax. 3 7 He "proposed
the law to take money out of the drug trade and recover
some of the cost of prosecuting and jailing drug offend-
ers., 38 His early estimates projected the legislation would
generate 3.6 million dollars per year. 39 The one-time cost
to the State of Tennessee to create the ten-person agency to
oversee the tax was 1.2 million dollars.
40
When compared to other states, Tennessee's drug
problem may be unique and slightly understated. Geo-
graphically, Tennessee touches eight states-more than any
other state in the nation. Drug trafficking often involves
the transportation of large volumes of narcotics between
many states before the product reaches its final destination.
For this reason, the flow of narcotics to and through Ten-
nessee is likely impacted by any adjacent state's drug activ-
ity.
Moreover, illegal drugs are often linked to violent
criminal activity, and Tennessee's violent crime rate ranks
(1991); see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1203.01D (West 1990)
(repealed 1997).36 d. at 231 (South Dakota and Florida enacted their statutes in 1984,
and Minnesota followed suit two years later).
37 Bonna de la Cruz, Tennessee Targets Dealers, Users with New Levy,
THE TENNESSEAN, Dec. 29, 2004, at IA; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §
105-113.107 (LexisNexis 2003).
38 Cruz, supra note 37, at 4A.39 1d. at IA.
4 Id.
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fifth among all states.41 Because of its location and the
violent nature of the drug trade, Tennessee has a compel-
ling interest in preventing illegal drug activity from increas-
ing within its borders. The Tennessee Legislature may be
under the assumption that a tax on narcotics could some-
how deter the illegal drug trade and at the same time, pro-
vide funding to combat its spread.
The seriousness of Tennessee's illegal drug problem
is apparent from the increasing amount of methampheta-
mine produced, distributed, and used in the state. It has
been reported that Tennessee accounts for three-fourths of
all methamphetamine lab seizures in the Southeast. 42 Ten-
nessee trails only Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri in the
number of methamphetamine lab seizures nationwide.43
Under Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax, the state
could expect large revenues from its frequent number of
methamphetamine lab seizures.
Tennessee's methamphetamine problem also causes
Tennessee taxpayers to incur additional out-of-pocket ex-
penses. Each methamphetamine lab has an estimated
cleanup cost of between $2,500 and $7,500, 44 and people
jailed for methamphetamine usage have extensive long-
term adverse health effects that are often treated while they
are in jail.45 High crime rates are also attributed to me-
thamphetamine usage. 46  Tennessee's unauthorized sub-
stance tax could be expected to offset these indirect costs
placed on Tennessee residents.





44Judd Matheny, Meth Problem Growing at a Fast Pace, TULLAHOMA
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IV. OPERATION OF TENNESSEE'S UNAUTHORIZED
SUBSTANCE TAX
Most unauthorized substance taxes are constructed
in the form of an excise tax on certain types and amounts of
illegal drugs. 47 When Tennessee's unauthorized substance
tax went into effect on January 1, 2005, it became the twen-
ty-third state in the union to implement an excise tax on
illegal drugs.48  Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax
was modeled after North Carolina's controlled substance
tax.
49
Tennessee's tax is levied on unauthorized sub-
stances possessed, either actually or constructively, at vari-
ous rates.50 The tax is only applicable to drug dealers
51
who possess an unauthorized substance. 52 A drug dealer is
required to pay the tax "within forty-eight hours of coming
into possession of unauthorized substances." 53 If the tax
for the unauthorized substances is not paid within the re-
quired time, then the tax is considered delinquent, and the
dealer will suffer a penalty and accrued interest.5 4 In addi-
tion, if a drug dealer is found with an unauthorized sub-
stance lacking a tax stamp, it is presumed that the dealer
has been in possession of the substance for more than forty-
eight hours.
55
47 Cruz, supra note 37, at 1A.
48 Id. at 4A.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2802 (a)(3)(A), (B) (2006) (a dealer is
a person who actually or constructively possesses more than forty-two
and one-half grams of marijuana, seven or more grams of any other
unauthorized substances that are sold by weight, or ten or more dosage





3:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 166
After the drug dealer pays the tax, the TDOR issues
tax stamps equal to the payment received in taxes.56 Next,
the drug dealer is required to indicate payment of the tax by
affixing the tax stamp to the possessed unauthorized sub-
stance. 57 Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax provides
that "information obtained pursuant to [payment of the tax]
is confidential and, unless independently obtained, may not
be used in a criminal prosecution other than ... for a viola-
tion of [the tax].'58
V. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ILLEGAL DRUG
TAXES
A. SELF-INCRIMINATION
The constitutionality of taxing illegal activities was
originally reviewed by four Supreme Court cases in the late
1960s.59 The Court found in each case that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevented
the imposition of sanctions from federal tax evasion of
illegal activities. Leary was the only case of the four that
involved the Fifth Amendment's use against a tax on illegal
drugs.6 1 The defendant, Timothy Leary,62 was, among
56 Id. § 67-4-2805(a).
17 Id. § 67-4-2806.
58 Id. § 67-4-2808.
59 See generally United States v. Leary, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (illegal
activity was possession of marijuana); Haynes v. United States, 390
U.S. 85 (1968) (illegal activity was possession of a sawed-off shotgun);
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (illegal activity was wa-
gering); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (illegal activity
was wagering).
60 Leary, 395 U.S. at 26; Haynes, 390 U.S. at 100-01; Grosso, 390 U.S.
at 67; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48.
61 Leary, 395 U.S. at 16 (at issue was the Marijuana Tax of 1937 that
was later repealed due to the Court's decision).
62 Timothy Leary was a well-known drug enthusiast and one-time
Harvard professor. He is most noted for his famous saying, "turn on,
53
3:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 167
other things, indicted on charges of having "knowingly
transported, concealed, and facilitated the transportation
and concealment of marihuana [sic] without having paid
the transfer tax imposed by the Marihuana [sic] Tax Act."
' 63
The pivotal issue in Leary was the construction of
the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.64 The statute required "the
taxpayer . . . 'register his name or style and his place or
places of business' at the nearest district office of the Inter-
nal Revenue Services." 65 The Court concluded that "[i]f
read according to its terms, the Marihuana [sic] Tax Act
compelled petitioner to expose himself to a 'real and appre-
ciable' risk of self-incrimination ... "66
The test for determining whether an illegal activity
tax is unconstitutional on self-incrimination grounds is
promulgated by Marchetti v. United States.67 The test con-
siders the following: "(1) whether the regulated activity is
in an area" of the law saturated with criminal statutes or
directed toward a specific group suspected of criminal
activity; (2) whether the obligation to pay the tax creates a
"real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination;" and (3)
whether the payment of the tax may be "a significant link
tune in, drop out," which was in reference to drug use. See Harry
Ransom Humanities Research Center, Timothy Leary Collection,
http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/research/falleary.html.
63 Leary, 395 U.S. at 11.64 Id. at 12.
" Id. at 14.66 Id. at 16; see also Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 97 (1968)
(finding a statute taxing illegal firearms exposed the taxpayer to a risk
of self-incrimination); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67 (1968)
(finding a statute taxing illegal wagering exposed the taxpayer to a risk
of self-incrimination); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60-61
(1968) (finding a statute taxing illegal wagering exposed taxpayer to a
risk of self-incrimination).
67 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
54
3:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 168
in the chain of evidence" to bring about criminal proceed-
ings or establish guilt.
68
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax satisfies the
first factor of the Marchetti test; the tax is imposed on un-
authorized substances, which carry criminal sanctions. 69 In
addition, the tax is only applicable to drug dealers, who are
a specific group suspected of criminal activity.
70
Applying the second factor of the Marchetti test,
some state courts have decided their state's illegal drug tax
is unconstitutional on the basis that the tax may compel the
disclosure of identifying information. 71 Illegal drug taxes
in other states have withstood constitutional scrutiny be-
cause courts have found safeguards that protect identifying
information from dissemination. 72 In State v. Hall,73 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the state's tax on
controlled substances unconstitutionally compelled self-
incrimination.74 The second factor of the Marchetti test
was fundamental to the court's determination. Analyzing
68 Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 1988) (citing Mar-
chetti, 390 U.S. at 47-48).69 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417 (2006).
701 Id. § 67-4-2802(a)(3)(A)-(B).
71 See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Herre, 634 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla.
1994) (holding that Florida's illegal drug tax violated both the Fifth
Amendment and the state constitution's right against self-
incrimination); State v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888, 890 (Idaho 1991) (finding
that the 1989 version of Idaho's illegal drug tax violated Fifth Amend-
ment protections).
72 See, e.g., Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So. 2d 120, 123
(Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (holding that a taxpayer could not reasonably
suppose that information provided to the tax department would be
available to prosecuting authorities or establish a significant link in the
chain of evidence); State v. Durrant, 769 P.2d 1174, 1180, 1182-83
(Kan. 1989) (holding that Kansas' illegal drug tax prohibited the dis-
closure of information to be used against a taxpayer in any criminal
proceeding not connected to the enforcement of the tax act, unless
independently obtained).
73 State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997).
74Id. at 783.
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the second factor, the court chose to evaluate separately
"the purchase and the affix and display requirements" of
Wisconsin's controlled substance tax.
75
The purchase requirement was found to be self-
incriminating because the dealer was compelled to reveal to
the government his drug dealing status and that he pos-
sessed or intended to possess a quantity of a controlled
substance, which was usually a large amount.76 Moreover,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the purchase require-
ment, due to the "exception for 'independently obtained
information,"' allowed law enforcement to place an agent
outside locations where tax stamps were sold.77 This would
permit law enforcement to take photographs and follow
taxpayers at its option.78 Nevertheless, the court found that
the option of purchasing tax stamps by mail alleviated any
anonymity issues a taxpayer might encounter by paying the
controlled substance tax in person.
79
The affixation requirement of Wisconsin's con-
trolled substance tax presented an entirely different concern
with respect to self-incrimination. The affixation of a tax
stamp to a narcotic was deemed to demonstrate that the
dealer "knowingly and intentionally possesse[d] a particu-
lar quantity of unlawful drugs." 80 The court concluded that
this information would be available to the prosecution in
order to prove that the defendant knew the substance pos-
sessed was controlled under Wisconsin law.
81
In Hall, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin also found
that Wisconsin's controlled substance tax satisfied the final
factor of the Marchetti test. The tax was deemed to only
allow a taxpayer "protection from direct-not derivative--
" Id. at 784.76 Id. at 785.
77 Id. at 785-86.
78 Id.
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use of information obtained by the [Wisconsin Department
of Revenue] through compliance with the statute."8 2 The
court found that the tax allowed "the State to use compelled
information" to obtain investigative leads that could later
be used in criminal proceedings.
83
There are many similarities between Tennessee's
unauthorized substance tax and Wisconsin's controlled
substance tax. Much like Tennessee's tax, Wisconsin's tax
requires taxpayers to purchase tax stamps that must be
attached to an illegal drug.84 Also, Wisconsin's controlled
substance tax does not demand identifying information for
the purchase of tax stamps, but the tax does allow indepen-
dently obtained information to be used in criminal prosecu-
85tions.
In light of Hall, the second and third factors of the
Marchetti test will lead Tennessee's unauthorized sub-
stance tax to the same fate as Wisconsin's controlled sub-
stance tax. First, people who purchase unauthorized
substance tax stamps reveal their intent to distribute illegal
drugs. Moreover, the TDOR website does not state where
or how people may purchase tax stamps. 86 Upon calling
the TDOR's office, potential taxpayers find no readily
available alternative to buying tax stamps directly from the
TDOR's central office in Nashville.
The taxpayers' only option to satisfy the tax may be
to appear in person at the TDOR's central office. Nothing
in Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax prevents law
enforcement from keeping twenty-four hour surveillance of
82 Id. at 787.
83 id.
84 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2805 (2006) with Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 139.89 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
85 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2808 with Wis. STAT. ANN. §
139.91 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
86 Tennessee Department of Revenue,
http://www.state.tn.us/revenue/faqs/unauthsubfaq.htn#unauth4 (last
visited Nov. 29, 2006).
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the TDOR's central office. 87 Accordingly, taxpayers may
be subject to police surveillance while discharging their tax
obligation for the distribution of an unauthorized substance.
The police may subsequently use this surveillance to corro-
borate previous notions of a suspect already under investi-
gation for the distribution of illegal drugs or gain new leads
on suspects involved in the illegal drug trade.
For these reasons, taxpayers may be apprehensive
about traveling to the TDOR's central office to obtain tax
stamps. Thus, taxpayers may inquire about receiving the
tax stamps via mail. This inquiry requires taxpayers to
supply their residential addresses, their P.O. Boxes, or their
acquaintances' addresses, all of which compromise the
taxpayers' anonymity, despite the ruling in Hall. Tennes-
see's unauthorized substance act invokes no penalties that
prevent employees of the TDOR from relaying information
concerning a taxpayer to law enforcement. 88 Therefore,
any of this information could be given to law enforcement
to be used as a link to the taxpayer. Requesting the stamps
via mail would still expose the taxpayer to a risk of disclos-
ing identifying information to law enforcement.
The last factor of the Marchetti test is also satisfied
by Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax. Tennessee's
tax does not forbid the use of "independently obtained"
information in a criminal prosecution. The language of
the statute permits the state to use compelled information to
obtain investigative leads that could later be used to bring
about criminal proceedings. As a result, any information
obtained by law enforcement from surveillance or any other
"independent" method may be used in the prosecution of a
taxpayer for the possession of an unauthorized substance.
The unequivocal language of Tennessee's unautho-
rized substance tax avoids the affixation problem discussed
87 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2808 (2006).
88 See id. §§ 67-4-2801 to 2811.
89Id. § 67-4-2808.
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in Hall. Although "knowingly" is the requisite intent to
convict a person for possession of an unauthorized sub-
stance in Tennessee, 90 Tennessee's unauthorized substance
tax provides that tax stamps may not be used in a criminal
prosecution for the possession of an unauthorized sub-
stance.91 The reader should note, however, that people who
purchase an unauthorized tax stamp would only do so if
they were aware that they possessed an unauthorized sub-
stance. Once they attach the tax stamp to the unauthorized
substance, they are admitting they know the substance they
possess is unauthorized under Tennessee law. Prosecutors
may not be able to enter tax stamps overtly into evidence,
but the prosecutors are likely to keep the unauthorized
substances in their original packaging, which could include
an affixed tax stamp. At trial, a juror may be hard pressed
to disregard inadmissible evidence that remains on admiss-
ible evidence.
B. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...
,92 Case law has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause
to protect against three distinct situations: (1) "a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal"; (2) "a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction";
and (3) "multiple punishments for the same offense." 93
Under the latter situation, the Supreme Court has had diffi-
culty in determining what constitutes a multiple punish-
90 See id. § 39-17-417(a)(4) ("It is an offense for a defendant to kno-
wingly... [p]ossess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture,
deliver or sell the controlled substance.").
91 See id. § 67-4-2808.
92 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
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ment. In Ex parte Lange,94 in which the defendant paid a
fine and suffered imprisonment for his crime, the Supreme
Court held against the imposition of another punishment
from the same verdict because "to do so is to punish him
twice for the same offence." 95 In United States v. Halper,
96
the Court concluded monetary penalties from a civil statute
imposed after a criminal prosecution also constituted a
multiple punishment and therefore violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
97
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch98 gave the Court the opportunity to examine whether
a tax could be considered a multiple punishment under a
Double Jeopardy analysis. 99 The question before the Su-
preme Court in Kurth Ranch was "whether a tax on the
possession of illegal drugs assessed after the State has im-
posed a criminal penalty for the same conduct may violate
the constitutional prohibition against successive punish-
ments for the same offense."
100
Although the Court found Montana's illegal drug
tax was high, neither the tax's lofty assessment nor deter-
rent purpose classified it as punishment. 1°1 No doubt ex-isted that Montana's illegal drug tax was implemented to
14 Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
95 Id. at 175 (emphasis in original).
96 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
9' Id. at 449-50.
98 Dep't of Revenue of Mon. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
9 9 
Id. at 767.
'O Id. at 769. The State of Montana enacted a tax on the storage and
possession of illegal drugs and provided that the state would be able to
collect the tax after the offenders satisfied their fines and obligations.
Id. at 770 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to 123). The Mon-
tana Department of Revenue was given authority to adopt rules to
oversee the tax. Id. at 770-71. The agency promulgated rules that
required the taxpayers to pay the tax sometime after their arrests and
placed the taxpayers under no obligation to file or pay the tax unless
arrested. Id. at 771.
1' Id. at 780.
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deter the drug trade, but the Montana Department of Reve-
nue claimed, and the Court accepted, that many taxes, such
as those on cigarettes and alcohol, are high and to some
extent motivated by deterrence. 102 Nonetheless, the high
rate of Montana's illegal drug tax did "lend support to the
characterization of the [tax] as punishment," although this
factor alone was not dispositive. 103
The Court found two "unusual features" that made
Montana's illegal drug tax especially problematic with the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 104 First, the tax was shown to be
conditioned strictly on criminal activity. 105  The Court
considered this condition to be significant because it dem-
onstrated that the tax had purposes other than raising reve-
nue; the tax also had punitive and prohibitory purposes. 1
06
Second, the tax was "exceptional" because "it [was] levied
on goods that the taxpayer neither own[ed] nor possesse[d]
when the tax [was] imposed." 107 Montana's illegal drug tax
required payment of the tax only after the offender had
been arrested and displaced of the illegal drug. The Court
found "[a] tax on 'possession' of goods that no longer exist
and that the taxpayer never lawfully possessed has an un-
mistakable punitive character."'
10 8
The Kurth Ranch decision essentially employed a
three-part test to determine whether a tax is punitive and
thus infringes on an individual's right against double jeo-
pardy. The test employs the following: (1) whether the
tax's rate is high enough to make it a significant deterrent;
(2) whether the tax is conditioned on the commission of a
crime; and (3) whether the tax levies on goods the taxpayer
102 Id. at 780-81.




7 Id. at 783.
108 Id.
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no longer owns nor lawfully possesses when the tax is
assessed.
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax satisfies the
first factor of the Kurth Ranch test. The tax is imposed on
various unauthorized substances as follows: $0.40-$3.50
for each gram of marijuana depending on the type, $200 for
each gram of any controlled substance or low-street value
drug sold by weight, $50 for each ten dosage unit of any
low-street value drug that is not sold by weight, and $200
for each ten dosage unit of any other controlled substance
that is not sold by weight.109 These rates may be regarded
as high enough to sustain an argument that Tennessee's
unauthorized substance tax is a significant deterrent. For
example, Tennessee's tax enforces approximately the same
tax rate on marijuana as Montana's illegal drug tax, which
the Kurth Ranch court characterized as "a remarkably high
tax." 1
10
As aforementioned, Tennessee's unauthorized sub-
stance tax is based on North Carolina's controlled sub-
stance tax. North Carolina's model has stood firm in state
court against attacks from the second and third factors of
the Marchetti test. For example, in State v. Ballenger,
1 I
the court distinguished North Carolina's controlled sub-
stance tax from Montana's illegal drug tax by finding it
"contain[ed] neither of the 'unusual features' upon which
the Supreme Court relied in Kurth Ranch to conclude that
Montana's dangerous drug tax constituted punishment for
double jeopardy purposes."' 112 The court was persuaded by
the fact that North Carolina's tax levies an assessment
forty-eight hours after a drug dealer comes into possession
109 TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2803 (2006).
110 Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780. The high end of Tennessee's tax on
marijuana imposes $3.50 per gram (or approximately $98 per ounce),
which is analogous to Montana's illegal drug tax that levied $100 per
ounce on marijuana. See id. at 780 n.17.
111 State v. Ballenger, 472 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
112 Id. at 574.
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of a controlled substance rather than imposing the tax after
the drug dealer has been apprehended by law enforce-
ment. 113  From this fact, the court inferred that the tax is
not levied on the commission of a crime, and the controlled
substance is not confiscated and destroyed before the tax
can be imposed. 
114
The Ballenger decision is unpersuasive in light of
the Kurth Ranch holding. First, North Carolina's con-
trolled substance tax is unsuccessful in circumventing the
requirement of avoiding a tax that is conditioned on the
commission of a crime. The Ballenger court fails to con-
sider North Carolina law regarding controlled sub-
stances. 115 The court neglects the fact that it is illegal for
any person to possess a controlled substance in North Caro-
lina. 116 This fact alone suffices as a violation of the Kurth
Ranch condition. A person must be in possession of a
controlled substance to be subject to North Carolina's con-
trolled substance tax.117 Thus, one could reasonably argue
that North Carolina's controlled substance tax is predicated
on the commission of a crime.
Additionally, North Carolina's controlled substance
tax may be said to violate the second "unusual feature" of
the Kurth Ranch decision. It is almost absurd to assume
that a drug dealer will satisfy an illegal drug tax before the
narcotic is seized by law enforcement. Drug dealers are
unlikely to pay the tax out of a reasonable suspicion that
the purchase, affixation, and display of a tax stamp may
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 575.
116 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2003).
117 See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,
781 (1994) (noting that "the tax assessment not only hinges on the
commission of a crime" but "is also exacted only after the [potential]
taxpayer has been arrested for precise conduct that gives rise to the tax
obligation .... ).
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signify admission to a crime.11l Consequently, when law
enforcement seize the controlled substance without an
affixed stamp, the dealer, who out of fear of self-
incrimination has not paid the tax, has been disposed of and
is no longer in control of the narcotic. More importantly, it
cannot be argued that the drug dealer ever lawfully owned
the controlled substance. 119 Given that Tennessee's tax is
modeled after North Carolina's tax, it will incur the same
constitutional problem with the Double Jeopardy Clause.
VI. COLLECTING REVENUE FROM TENNESSEE'S
UNAUTHORIZED SUBSTANCE TAx
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax was con-
templated to generate millions of dollars in revenue for the
state's general fund and local and state law enforcement
agencies. 120  Since its inception in January of 2005, the
results have not been as encouraging as estimates envi-
sioned. According to the TDOR, the tax garnered only
$340,000 in its first year. 121 This figure is further diluted
by the fact that the Drug Investigation Division of the Ten-
nessee Bureau of Investigation reported that from 2005 to
the first half of 2006 it seized 5,340 grams of crack co-
caine; 111,064 grams of powder cocaine; 4,309 pounds of
bulk marijuana; 12,897 marijuana plants; 9,169 grams of
methamphetamine; 88 methamphetamine labs; and 5,912
118 See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16 (1969).
119 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)(3); see Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 783
(finding that the tax was levied on goods that were no longer in posses-
sion of the taxpayer and "never lawfully possessed," which gave the
drug tax "an unmistakable punitive character").
120 Cruz, supra note 37, at 4A.
121 TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, REVENUE COLLECTIONS
(Dec. 2005), http://state.tn.us/revenue/pubs/2OO5/coll2OO512.pdf;
REVENUE COLLECTIONS (June 2005),
http:l/state.tn.us/revenue/pubs/2005/coll200506.pdf (last visited June
15, 2006). These figures only calculate actual collections and do not
factor in assessments as a result of the tax. Id.
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dosage units of ecstasy. 122 This information also suggests
that the tax is not recovered as easily as predicted.
Notably, the state spent $1.2 million to establish the
TDOR agency that administers the unauthorized substance
tax. The yearly maintenance of this agency was projected
to cost an additional $800,000.123 Although it may be pre-
mature to evaluate the successfulness of the tax, the early
returns are definitely not consistent with initial projections.
Diminutive returns also raise questions about the
validity of the tax. Not surprisingly, only $1,300 in tax
stamps were collected in the tax's first year of existence. 124
These returns should cause concern over whether the unau-
thorized substance tax is arbitrary. If drug dealers are not
purchasing unauthorized substance tax stamps, and the tax
is only assessed and never recovered, then the presumption
may be that Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax is
clearly to punish drug dealers.
VII. CONCLUSION
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax has the po-
tential to raise constitutional concerns each time it is en-
forced. Undoubtedly, the tax will come under scrutiny for
the abridgment of the Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination and double jeopardy. Additionally, Tennes-
122 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ANNUAL REPORT (2004-
2005), at 5, http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/Info%2ODiv/Color%20-
%20TBI%2004-05%2OAnnual%2OReport.pdf (last visited June 15,
2006).
123 Cruz, supra note 37, at IA.
124 TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, REVENUE COLLECTIONS
(Dec. 2005), http://state.tn.us/revenue/pubs/2005/coll200512.pdf;
REVENUE COLLECTIONS (June 2005),
http://state.tn.us/revenue/pubs/2005/coll200506.pdf (last visited Jun.
15, 2006). The purchase of $1,300 worth of tax stamps does not neces-
sarily signify that those stamps were purchased to affix to an unautho-
rized substance. Those stamps could have been purchased for other
reasons (e.g., as collector's items).
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see has not streamlined a process to recover revenue from
the tax. If the unauthorized substance tax is to remain un-
der Tennessee law, the State of Tennessee must ensure that
the tax does not have any characteristics that would lead the
general public to believe its purpose is arbitrary or abusive
of constitutional rights. Because of these concerns, the
Tennessee Legislature should reconsider the legitimacy of
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax.
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THE CONFUSION OF PHILIP MoRRIs: How THE
SUPREME COURT CAME TO HOLD THAT PUNITIVE
DAMAGES CANNOT BE USED TO PUNISH FOR
HARM TO NON-PARTIES, BUT THAT JURORS ARE
ALLOWED TO CONSIDER HARM TO NON-PARTIES
WHEN DECIDING TO IMPOSE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Anne Passino
I. INTRODUCTION
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,1 the United
States Supreme Court examined the constitutional propriety
of a large punitive damages award levied against a defen-
dant tobacco company in favor of a single plaintiff. A jury
had awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5
million in punitive damages to the widow of a heavy ciga-
rette smoker for her husband's smoking-related death be-
cause the tobacco company knowingly and falsely
promoted smoking as safe.2 The Court held that permitting
a jury to base any part of a punitive damages award upon a
desire to punish the defendant for harming non-parties
amounted to a taking of "property" from the defendant in
contravention to the Constitution's Due Process Clause.
3
In granting review of Philip Morris, the Supreme
Court attempted to clarify what a jury may properly con-
sider when determining a punitive damages award. Unlike
other recent punitive damages cases, the Court asked, inde-
pendently of whether the award could be considered
"grossly excessive," only whether such a large award to a
1 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
2 Id. at 1061.
3 Id. at 1060.
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single plaintiff4 offended due process. 5  The Court con-
cluded that although it is constitutionally acceptable for a
jury to consider the potential and actual harm to non-parties
as probative evidence of reprehensibility, a jury must not
use its verdict to punish potential or actual harm to non-
parties. 6 In at least the context of mass torts, Philip Morris
purports to satisfy the substantive due process concerns of
arbitrariness and unfairness with a procedural mechanism. 7
This synopsis argues that Philip Morris, which has
been characterized as a boon to both corporations and
plaintiffs, does no more than re-cast a "distinction without a
difference," 8 leaving jurors with little more guidance than
previous punitive damages jurisprudence provided. By
creating a procedural mechanism that variously permits and
prohibits jurors from using the same evidence in their cal-
culation of punitive damages, the Court has ensured that it
will continue to revisit and revise this area of the law.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE ANALYSIS
A. A Brief History of Punitive Damage
Jurisprudence
The modem era of Supreme Court punitive damag-
es jurisprudence began in 1991 when, in Pacific Mutual
4 Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, it should be noted that
a state statute would have required that the punitive damages awarded
to this single plaintiff be subject to a state statute that makes such
awards payable in whole or in part to the State, rather than to the pri-
vate litigant. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1) (2003)).
5 Id. at 1063.
6 Id. at 1064, 1065.
7Id. at 1065.
8 Editorial, Class Actions in Drag: The Supreme Court Splits More
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Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,9 the Court attempted to settle
the "long-enduring debate" about the propriety of punitive
damages. 10 Prior to this decision, the Court repeatedly
declined to address whether the Due Process Clause limited
punitive damages awards.1 Instead, trial courts and juries
were guided by the common law. 12 "Under the traditional
common-law approach, the amount of the punitive award
[was] initially determined by a jury instructed to consider
the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar
wrongful conduct."' 13 And, in large part due to the
longstanding history of this approach, the Court rejected
challenges that punitive damages necessarily violated due
process. 14
To buttress its conclusion that punitive damages are
not per se violative of either the Due Process or Excessive
Fines Clauses of the Constitution, the Court pointed to the
many "enactments during the period between 1275 and
1753 [that] provided for double, treble, or quadruple dam-
ages."'15  This ancient calculation of "reasonableness"
formed the basis for the Court's twentieth-century assertion
that an award four times the amount of the awarded com-
pensatory damages, "may be close to the line... [of] con-
stitutional impropriety."' 6  Although larger awards have
9 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
'0 Id. at8.
i1 Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on
Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 423, 430 (2004).
12 Id. at 432.
13 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15.14 Id. at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Historical acceptance of legal
institutions serves to validate them not because history provides the
most convenient rule of decision but because we have confidence that a
long-accepted legal institution would not have survived if it rested upon
procedures found to be either irrational or unfair.").
BMW of N. Ain, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996).
16 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24.
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since been upheld, the Court's due process analysis retains
its ratio-based common law roots.
B. The Court Acknowledges Due Process and
Sets Up a Three-Guidepost Test for
Excessiveness
In Haslip, the Supreme Court first acknowledged
that the Due Process Clause imposes at least some proce-
dural constraints on the size of punitive damages. 17 There,
because an instruction guided the jury's discretion 18 and
state common-law required judicial review 19 of the award's
excessiveness, the Court was satisfied that the defendant
had received procedural due process.
Substantive due process was addressed two years
later in TXO Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resource
Corp. In TXO, the Court upheld a punitive award that
was nearly 526 times larger than the compensatory award,
declining to find the award "grossly excessive., 2 1  "It is
appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm
17 Franze, supra note 11, at 433.
18 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-20 ("The instructions thus enlightened the
jury as to the punitive damages' nature and purpose, identified the
damages as punishment for civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and
explained that their imposition was not compulsory. .... ").
19 Id. at 20 ("[T]rial courts are 'to reflect in the record the reasons for
interfering with a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on grounds of
excessiveness of the damages.' Among the factors... [for considera-
tion] are the 'culpability of the defendant's conduct,' the 'desirability of
discouraging others from similar conduct,' the 'desirability of discou-
raging others from similar conduct,' the impact upon the parties,' and
'other factors, such as the impact on innocent third parties."'). Judicial
review remains a required feature of punitive damages claims. See,
e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (striking down a
provision of the Oregon Constitution that prohibited - with limited
exceptions -judicial review of punitive damage awards for excessive-
ness).
20 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
21 Id. at 454,462.
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that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its in-
tended victim ...as well as the possible harm to other
victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior
were not deterred., 22  Justifying such a large departure
from the four-to-one ratio, Justice Kennedy noted that "a
more manageable constitutional inquiry focuses not on the
amount of money a jury awards in a particular case but on
its reasons for doing so."
23
Three years later, in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,24 the Supreme Court reversed a punitive damages
award. In so doing, the Court articulated three "guide-
posts" to determine whether an award is unconstitutionally
excessive under the Due Process Clause such that the de-
fendant cannot be said to have "fair notice" of punishment
and penalty: (1) "the degree of reprehensibility" of the
defendant's conduct, (2) "the disparity between the harm or
potential harm suffered . . and [the] punitive damages
award," and (3) "the difference between this remedy and
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases." 25 At least in part because the BMWjury had impro-
perly been permitted to consider similar, but lawful, out-of-
state conduct in its award calculation, the Court concluded
that the award was excessive. 26 The Court did not address
22 Id. at 460. In this case, the claim was brought in response to a failed
fraudulent scheme, so the Court opined that the ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages would be less "shocking" had the scheme
been successful. Id. at 462.
23 Id. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 562 (1996).
25 Id. at 574-75. In his dissent, Justice Scalia suggests that these "guide
posts" are worthless because, "the application of the Court's new rule
of constitutional law is constrained by no principle other than the
Justices' subjective assessment of the 'reasonableness' of the award in
relation to the conduct for which it was assessed." Id. at 599 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
26 Id. at 571, 573.
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whether a jury may consider out-of-state unlawful con-
duct.
27
C. Post-BMW Clarifications Leading up to
State Farm
With BMW, the Court had finally established stan-
dards for post-verdict review of punitive damages awards.
However, lower courts came to divergent conclusions about
how to interpret and implement the "guideposts," and the
Court was criticized for not having provided true guidance
and for leaving many questions unanswered. 28 Unfortu-
nately, the next punitive damages case did not enable the
Court to answer substantive questions about the guideposts,
though it did set the standard of review for appellate courts
"considering the constitutionality of the punitive damages
award."29 In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., the Court reasoned that because punitive dam-
ages are "quasi-criminal" and non-factual determinations,
30
appellate courts should apply a de novo standard of review,
as they do in "analogous cases" where deprivations of life,
liberty, and property are at stake. 31 The Court explained
27 Id. at 573 n.20.
28 Franze, supra note 11, at 428 n.29.
29 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
426 (2001).30 But see id. at 446, 445 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing (1) that "a
jury's verdict on punitive damages is fundamentally dependent on
determinations we characterize as factfindings and (2) that the proper
standard is abuse of discretion because of both the Seventh Amendment
and the differences between a trial court's experience in the courtroom
and an appellate court's removed vantage point).
31 Id. at 434. As in previous punitive damages cases, Justices Thomas
and Scalia dissented, taking the position that the Constitution does not
limit punitive damages awards; in this case, however, Justice Thomas
agreed with the majority that the proper standard was de novo while
Justice Scalia only conceded that de novo was the proper standard
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that de novo review is particularly appropriate in areas of
the law where the standards "acquire content only through
application," so that independent appellate review helps "to
maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles," and
"unify precedent' and 'stabilize the law.'
32
Then, in 2003, the Court decided State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,33 a case in
which a punitive damages award 145 times larger than the
compensatory damages award was held to be unconstitu-
tionally excessive under each of the BMW guideposts.
34
Although the Court found the case to be "neither close nor
difficult," 35 it clarified that to determine "reprehensibility,"
one should consider whether:
[T]he harm caused was physical as opposed
to economic; the tortious conduct evidence
an indifference to or a reckless disregard of
the health or safety of others; the target of
the conduct had financial vulnerability; the
conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the re-
sult of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit,
or mere accident. 36
As these factors relate to similar, lawful out-of-state con-
duct with a "nexus" to the plaintiff, the Court stated that
such evidence of reprehensibility may be considered as
demonstrative of "deliberateness and culpability," but,
however probative, it may not be used to punish.37 Punish-
because it best comported with precedent from which he originally
dissented in favor of abuse of discretion. Id. at 443-44.32 Id. at 436.
33 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).34 Id. at 418.
35 /d. at 418.
36/d. at 419.
3 Id. at 422.
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ing for non-party harm would violate due process because
one plaintiffs claim would serve as proxy for improperly
arguing "the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims
against a defendant under the guise of reprehensibility
analysis ... *38
Finally, the State Farm Court reviewed the proper
standard of analysis for ratios of punitive to compensatory
awards and concluded that, "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are
more likely to comport with due process ... ,,39 Upward
departures may be possible, the court allowed, where (1) "a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages," (2) "the injury is hard to
detect," or (3) "the monetary value of non-economic harm
might have been difficult to determine., 40 Combined with
the Court's latest clarification about ratio-calculations, for
three years, State Farm permitted the inference that unlaw-
ful out-of-state conduct and resulting harm to non-parties,
might be properly considered by a fact-finder and used to
increase punitive damages under the "reprehensibility"
guidepost.
III.PHILIP MORRIS'S PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Pre-State Farm Trial and Appellate Review
Mayola Williams, the widow of Jesse Williams, a
smoker, brought suit against Philip Morris USA for "negli-
gence and fraud, asserting a causal connection between
Jesse Williams' smoking habit and his death."'" At trial, a
jury found that Philip Morris, the manufacturer of the de-
ceased's favorite cigarette brand, had been negligent and
Id. at 423.
3 Id. at 425.
40 Id. at 425.
41 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1167 (Or. 2006).
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had engaged in deceit.42 The trial judge rejected the defen-
dant's suggested instruction on punitive damages 43 and
instead instructed the jury that "[p]unitive damages are
awarded against a defendant to punish misconduct and to
deter misconduct," and "are not intended to compensate the
plaintiff or anyone else for damages caused by the defen-
dant's conduct."44  The jury then awarded the plaintiff
$821,000 in compensatory damages for the negligence and
fraud claims and $79.5 million in punitive damages for the
42 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
43 The proposed jury instructions read:
If you determine that some amount of punitive dam-
ages should be imposed on the defendant, it will then
be your task to set an amount that is appropriate. This
should be such amount as you believe is necessary to
achieve the objectives of deterrence and punishment.
While there is no set formula to be applied in reach-
ing an appropriate amount, I will now advise you of
some of the factors that you may wish to consider in
this connection.
(1) The size of any punishment should bear a reason-
able relationship to the harm caused to Jesse Wil-
liams by the defendant's punishable misconduct.
Although you may consider the extent of harm suf-
fered by others in determining what that reasonable
relationship is, you are not to punish the defendant
for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other per-
sons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which
other juries can resolve their claims and award puni-
tive damages for those harms, as such other juries see
fit.
(2) The size of the punishment may appropriately re-
flect the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct -- that is, how far the defendant has departed
from accepted societal norms of conduct.
Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068-69.
44 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
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fraud claim.45 The trial judge remitted the punitive damag-
es award to $32 million which, after both sides appealed,
was restored by the Oregon Court of Appeals to the full
$79.5 million found by the jury.46 After the Oregon Su-
preme Court denied review, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari and ordered that the case be remanded to
the Oregon Court of Appeals in light of its recent State
Farm holding.
47
B. The State Courts Attempt to Comply with State
Farm
Upon remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld
its prior findings, prompting the Oregon Supreme Court to
grant review. 48 There, Philip Morris argued that the jury
instruction on punitive damages made it likely that the
$79.5 million award was a punishment for harms to persons
other than the plaintiff, in violation of the Due Process
Clause. 49 Like the state appellate court, the Oregon Su-
preme Court rejected Philip Morris' arguments, finding the
punitive damage award not "grossly excessive" because the
Constitution does not prohibit a state jury from using puni-
tive damages to punish harm caused to non-parties by the
defendant. 50  Philip Morris then petitioned the U.S. Su-
preme Court for certiorari which the Court again granted.
45 Id. at 1061; Williams, 127 P.3d at 1171.
46 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. The defendant also argued that the nearly 100 to 1 ratio of the
punitive damages award to the compensatory damages award exceeded
the traditional and suggested maximum of 9 to 1 ratios that "are more
likely to comport with due process" because they demonstrate a "rea-
sonable relationship" between the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Id. at
1061 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-85
(1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003)).
'0 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.
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C. The Supreme Court Grants Review for the Second
Time and Establishes a New Rule
Philip Morris raised two issues in its appeal: (1)
whether "Oregon had unconstitutionally permitted it to be
punished for harming nonparty victims," and (2) "whether
Oregon had in effect disregarded 'the constitutional re-
quirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to
the plaintiff s harm."' 51 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
structured its analysis so that by answering the first ques-
tion, it did not need to answer the second question.
52
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer began with the
proposition that the purpose of punitive damages is to "pu-
nish unlawful conduct and deter its repetition," 53 but con-
cluded that there is "no authority supporting the use of
punitive damages awards for the purpose of punishing a
defendant for harming others." 54 As such, Philip Morris
holds that punitive damage awards must be examined under
a "constitutional standard" 55 that permits evidence of harm
to others to be used in the jury's assessment of reprehensi-
bility but that prevents such evidence from being used in
the jury's assessment of punitive damages.
" Id. at 1062.
52 See id. at 1063 ("Because we shall not decide whether the award here
at issue is 'grossly excessive,' we need now only consider the Constitu-
tion's procedural limitations.").
51 Id. at 1062.
54 Id. at 1063. To clarify, the Court says that State Farm permitted the
consideration of potential harm to the plaintiff alone and that BWM left
the question open, though "punitive damages calculations [described by
the Court as "error-free"] likely included harm to others in the equa-
tion." Id. at 1063.
55Id. at 1065.
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IV. "CONSTITUTIONAL TORT REFORM": MORE
GUIDELINES WITHOUT MORE GUIDANCE
A. Private Plaintiffs and the Problem of Im-
plementation
Philip Morris is the unfortunate heir of the prob-
lems inherent in previous Supreme Court opinions on puni-
tive damages. 56  Despite the evolving, complex standards
propounded by the Court to help evaluate punitive damage
awards for "gross excessiveness," reviewing courts still
have little more guidance than an "I know it when I see it"
standard.57 Because the Court has not formulated standards
that produce predictable results, 58 it must repeatedly revise
56 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Tort Reform: Limiting
State Power to Articulate and Develop Tort Law-Defamation, Preemp-
tion, and Punitive Damages, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1189, 1244 (2006)
("The Court's recent punitive damages cases are, as a group, the least
consistent with the traditional model [of adjudicating cases]. They
provide little prediction force, tread the most oppressively on state
power, and, in general aspects, lack reasoned or persuasive analytical
bases.").57 In TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481
(1993), Justice O'Connor wrote in her dissenting opinion that:
In my view, due process at least requires judges to
engage in searching review where the verdict disclos-
es such great disproportions as to suggest the possi-
bility of bias, caprice, or passion. As Justice Stevens
observed in a different context, "one need not use
Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity -- 'I
know it when I see it' -- as an ultimate standard for
judging" the constitutionality of a punitive damages
verdict "to recognize that the dramatically irregular"
size and nature of an award "may have sufficient
probative force to call for an explanation."
In State Farm, the Utah Supreme Court attempted to apply the BMW
standards (which caused it to reinstate the $145 million punitive dam-
ages award), but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and not only
found the award excessive in light of the same standards but stated that
such a determination was "neither close nor difficult." State Farm, 538
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its substantive due process analysis which consequently
grows more nuanced with each case. Paradoxically, these
are nuances that Supreme Court justices 59 and law profes-
sors 60 struggle with but that jurors must implement.
As a result of the confused precedent, cries for fur-
ther "tort reform" are frequently the response to large puni-
tive damages awards. 6 1 However, to contextualize the size
of the awards and to understand the difficulty that the Court
faces in crafting true reform, one must first accept that
when a defendant is a major player in the globalized econ-
omy and perpetrates a harm on countless people, this is a
very different claim than that with which traditional negli-
gence analysis dealt. 62  So, although reform has been
sought through state and federal legislatures, in cases like
Philip Morris, the U.S. Supreme Court has also been in-
volved in "constitutional tort reform."
Judicially-initiated "tort reform" is perhaps best un-
derstood as the Court's attempt at checking the theoretical-
U.S. at 418. Similarly, when the Supreme Court remanded Philip
Morris to the Oregon Supreme Court with directions to reevaluate the
$79.5 million punitive damages award in light of State Farm, the Ore-
gon Supreme Court found the full amount justified under U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and found the
award violated due process. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1060.
59 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60 Posting of Ethan Leib to PrawfsBlawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/02/punitives-and p.h
tml (Feb. 21, 2007, 04:10 EST).
61 See, e.g., Franze, supra note 11, at 423 ("A jury recently awarded a
single plaintiff $28 billion in punitive damages. That's billion, as in
nine zeros-all to one person. Given the frequent reports of multimil-
lion dollar verdicts, it is easy to become desensitized to 'skyrocketing'
F unitive damages awards.").
See Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages:
Why State Farm Won't Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 811-
12 (2004) ("In applying the tenets of the modem concept of due
process to the frequent and often large punitive damage awards im-
posed by state courts today, the Court has found it necessary to create a
substantial new body of constitutional law.").
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ly unlimited liability to which individual defendants like
State Farm and Philip Morris are subjected when each
victim of a mass tort is allowed to bring a separate action
against a defendant corporation. Ideally, a balance should
be struck which would permit individual victims of mass
torts to have their "day in court" but which would also try
to protect defendants from arbitrary, excessive punishments
and "civil double jeopardy." 63 Commentators disagree as
to whether Philip Morris helps resolve this paradox of
scale 64 and in whose favor.
65
The practical issue the Court faced in Philip Morris,
then, was how to deal with evidence of aggregate harm to
non-parties when such harm formed the basis for the plain-
tiffs suit. In consumer-manufacturer suits, the Court had
63 Cf. BMW, 517 U.S. at 592-93 ("Some economists... have argued for
a standard that would deter illegal activity causing solely economic
harm through the use of punitive damages awards that, as a whole,
would take from a wrongdoer the total cost of the harm caused....
Larger damages might also 'double count' by including in the punitive
damages award some of the compensatory, or punitive, damages that
subsequent plaintiffs would also recover.") (Breyer, J., concurring).
64 Douglas W. Kmiec, Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court Loses Its
Unanimity, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2160286 ("[The
opinion] is not an example of clarity. It is, instead, what happens when
you're lucky enough to be in a position to delegate to others the imple-
mentation of unworkable rules.").
65 Compare Editorial, Shielding the Powerful, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2007, at A20, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/opinion/21wedl.html?ei=509
("[The decision] is a win for corporate wrongdoers. It stretches the
Constitution's guarantee of due process in a way that will make it
easier for companies that act reprehensibly to sidestep serious punish-
ments."), with Editorial, Reigning in Juries, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007,
at A18, available at
http://www.latirnes.coninews/printededition/asection/la-ed-
tobacco22feb22,1,5904297.story ("The U.S. Supreme Court went
further this week - though not far enough - in reigning in juries in civil
cases that award outlandish punitive damages .... Breyer has brought
some clarity to a confused area of the law.").
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to decide how large a role evidence that Philip Morris pro-
duced and marketed cigarettes to more people than Mr.
Williams should play in Mr. Williams' private suit against
Philip Morris. The Court's solution is to allow the evi-
dence to be presented but to guide the jury's discretion and
thereby prevent the jury from holding a defendant account-
able for the entire universe of the defendant's harmful con-
duct. Evidence of harm to non-parties may be used, the
Court holds, to show reprehensibility; it may not be used,
however, "to punish a defendant directly on account of
harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties."
' 66
There is, however, a "practical problem' 67 created
by the Philip Morris holding: how will a reviewing court
know if the jury did, in fact, use the properly admitted
evidence for an improper purpose? Without specifying the
appropriate procedure, the Court cautions that states must
"provide some form of protection" in the form of proce-
dures that prevent "an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of
any such confusion occurring. ' 68 This will not be an easy
task. The jury instruction proffered by Philip Morris but
ultimately rejected by the trial court judge contained what
would turn out to be the majority's distinction, but Justice
Ginsburg warns that, "A judge seeking to enlighten rather
than confuse surely would resist delivering the requested
charge. ' ,69 If this is true, it would appear that rather than
buttressing procedural safeguards, Philip Morris further
entrenches the Court in its position of fighting excessive




66 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
67 Id. at 1065.
68 Id. at 1065.
69 Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70 Cf. Editorial, Class Actions in Drag: The Supreme Court Splits More
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Large punitive damages awarded to individual
plaintiffs are the most susceptible to being overturned post-
Philip Morris because the Court did not provide adequate
guidance about what safeguards will pass constitutional
muster. Even-perhaps especially-if the jury is given in-
structions based on the Court's own language distinguish-
ing between reprehensibility and punishment, defendants
will rightfully argue that any evidence of large-scale harm
offered in one aspect of the trial will likely bleed over into
the jury's determination of punitive damages.
B. Philip Morris May Require Class Actions to
Punish Corporate Wrongdoing
Philip Morris is also significant because it may
mark the beginning of the constitutionalization of class
actions for mass tort lawsuits. By prohibiting juries from
punishing for harm to "strangers to the litigation," 72 the
Court effectively holds that aggregate harm may only be
punished when a critical mass of victims bring a joint
suit.
73
As the author of Philip Morris, Justice Breyer em-
phasizes procedural and, arguably, 74 quasi-substantive, due
(arguing that the Court's reliance on judicial discretion rather than
tooting decisions in the Constitution improperly privileges the judiciary
over other branches).
71 Douglas W. Kniec, Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court Loses Its
Unanimity, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2160286.
72 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
73 In addition, under the Philip Morris rule, it is possible that any harm
that resulted from Philip Morris' conduct that was not victim-specific
(like an increase in teen smoking over a period of time) could not be
F4unished.
See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It
matters not that the Court styles today's holding as 'procedural' be-
cause the 'procedural' rule is simply a confusing implementation of the
83
3:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 197
process concerns like adequate notice and equal application
of the law. A preview of the opinion's procedural perspec-
tive can be seen in Justice Breyer's BMW concurrence. 75 In
the name of procedural due process, 76 Justice Breyer takes
an individualized perspective of harm, so that the scope of
Philip Morris' harmful conduct is relevant to the Court only
insofar as it affects the present plaintiff. Thus, the Court
does not make analytical adjustments to the procedural due
process formula to compensate for the unique relationship
between consumers and manufacturers, a relationship
where harm accrues in individuals despite the fact that
companies do not specifically target individuals, except
insofar as each individual forms an indistinguishable part of
the collective consumer class.
In TXO, the Court had suggested that "It is appro-
priate to consider . . . the possible harm to other victims
that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not
deterred., 77 In order to overrule TXO and BMW,78 the Phi-
lip Morris Court imported language from Lindsey v. Nor-
substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive
damages").
75 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 562, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("This constitutional concern [that there be legal standards
for punitive damages], itself harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises
out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or
property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of
arbitrary coercion.").
76 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (naming the "fundamental due
process concerns" to be "risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of
notice").
77 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993).78 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (arguing that TXO and BMW do not
conflict with the Court's current holding). But see Posting of Dan
Markel to PrawfsBlawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/02/philipmorrisu.ht
ml (Feb. 20, 2007, 16:40 EST) ("The Court today invokes TXO and
BMW as support or silence for its position that harm to non-parties
may not be considered other than to determine reprehensibility. This is
only possible by ignoring the language quoted above from TXO.").
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met:79 "[T]he Due Process Clause prohibits a State from
punishing an individual without first providing that indi-
vidual with 'an opportunity to present every available de-
fense."' 80 Lindsey involved a challenge to a landlord-tenant
statute. 81 Referencing language from such a small-scale
dispute involving no punitive damages does not appear
apposite to a claim like that in Philip Morris which spanned
the twentieth century and affected millions of consumers.
Although it is true that Lindsey is often invoked by defen-
dants in large class actions, Philip Morris is the fist time it
has appeared in the Court's punitive damages cases. 82
The Court's use of Lindsey could suggest that plain-
tiffs like Mrs. Williams cannot avoid procedural due
process violations by joining as many parties as possible to
the suit, because if there are too many co-plaintiffs, a de-
fendant can argue that any punitive damages will have to be
based on statistical evidence and that statistics and formulas
of damage to aggregate plaintiffs do not enable defendants
to present "every available defense." 83 Given these consid-
erations, the practical significance of the Court's reliance
on Lindsey will depend on how broadly or narrowly the
79 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972).
'0 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. 66).
The Court explained that if Philip Morris were punished for harm to
non-parties, it could not defend by showing that the victim was not
entitled to damages "because he or she knew that smoking was danger-
ous or did not rely upon the defendant's statements to the contrary. Id.
at 1063. However, this argument ignores that punitive damages are to
punish and deter wrongful conduct and that in this example, Philip
Morris' conduct was deceptive regardless of whether individual smoke-
rs were deceived.
1 Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 58 (quoting from a case in which a surety
company claimed a due process violation because of lack of notice of a
bond hearing).
82 Posting of Mark Moller to Cato @ Liberty,
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2007/02/21/
hilip-morris-v-williams-and-class-actions (Feb. 21, 2007, 14:07 EST).
See generally id. (analogizing from Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474
F.3d 1214 (9th Cir.2007)).
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language of "every available defense," is read by the Court.
Thus, for now, it would appear that in order to effectuate
the punishment and deterrence purposes of punitive dam-
ages, plaintiffs must unite as a class, but a class that is not
too large that individual defenses cannot still be offered.
C. The Effect of the Changing Face of the Su-
preme Court on Punitive Damages
Justice Stevens, the author of Cooper Industries,
BMW, and TXO, dissented in Philip Morris. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens refers to the majority's holding as a "novel-
ty" whose "nuance eludes" him. 84 The proper analysis, he
suggests, would acknowledge the separate purposes of
compensatory and punitive damages, because, "To award
compensatory damages to remedy such third-party harm
might well constitute a taking of property," 5 but that "pu-
nitive damages are a sanction for the public harm the de-
fendant's conduct has caused on threatened., 86 His dissent
is significant not only because Justice Stevens is the oldest
member of the Court and the author of three major punitive
damages decisions of the 1990's, but also because Justice
Stevens had been part of the State Farm majority that em-
phasized "single-digit"8 7 ratios as the measure of constitu-
tionality; here, by comparative omission, he would have
held the Philip Morris one hundred to one ratio acceptable.
With the replacements of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor,
it is possible that higher ratios, even where the compensato-
ry damages are as high as in Philip Morris, might be okay
84 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). By compari-
son, Justice Thomas dissents because he characterizes the majority's
holding as pretending to be procedural when it is "simply a confusing
implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has
created for punitive damages." Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,425 (2003).
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(so long as the jury does not consider extra-punitive infor-
mation).
Three other justices dissented in Philip Morris, but
none joined Justice Stevens' reasoning. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia, accepted
the majority's distinction as cogent but found that the State
properly guided the jury's discretion in this case.88 In ef-
fect, then, eight of nine justices agreed to constitutionalize
another element of punitive damages analysis. Highlight-
ing the ideological inconsistencies 89 so prevalent in puni-
tive damages cases and getting a jab in at her colleagues,
Justice Ginsburg proclaimed that she would, "accord more
respectful treatment to the proceedings and dispositions of
state courts that sought diligently to adhere to our changing,
less than crystalline precedent."
' 90
As for the newest members of the Court, because
Philip Morris both sets aside a jury-formulated, state court-
sanctioned $79.5 million judgment and further constitutio-
nalizes punitive damages, it is perhaps unexpected that
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Brey-
er's majority opinion. The commentators are split on the
significance of the newest justices' alignment with the
majority: some claim it "demonstrate[s] their awareness
that when punitive-damage awards grow large enough, real
issues of justice and fairness (and thus due process) are
implicated," 91 while others chide the conservative justices
" Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).89 For another inconsistency regarding the principles of federalism and
comity, procedural due process seeks to minimize "the risk that puni-
tive damages awards ... impose one State's (or one jury's) policies
(e.g., banning cigarettes) upon other States," id. at 1064, but in the
name of quashing arbitrary punitive damage awards, the Court over-
turned a judgment that the highest court in Oregon upheld. As such,
the Court privileged a federal-level consistency among the states'
awards over federalism itself.
90 Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
91 Editorial, Class Actions in Drag: The Supreme Court Splits More
Differences on Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2007, at A16,
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for disregarding the "bedrock conservative policy that leg-
islatures, not judges, make these policy calls." 92 In this five
to four split decision, Justice Kennedy appears to have
broken the tie, as has become his wont on the Roberts
Court. Interestingly, two conservative and two liberal jus-
tices joined the majority while two conservative and two
liberal justices dissented. As the hypothesized tie-breaker,
Justice Kennedy, the author of State Farm, may have
joined the majority on the basis of finding the ratio of com-
pensatory to punitive damages excessive. Alternatively,
Philip Morris may truly signal a new course for punitive
damages led by the newest members of the Court.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan's concern that "punitive damages
are imposed by juries guided by little more than an admoni-
tion to do what they think is best," 93 was articulated before
the Supreme Court attempted to guide juries' discretion,
but after nearly twenty years of trying, juries are now
guided by a combination of confusing directions with fine
distinctions. Philip Morris, an opinion untried by applica-
tion, appears to favor (1) corporate defendants, by limiting
the evidence that individual plaintiffs can use to bolster
punitive damage awards, and (2) classes of plaintiffs, by
not ruling that the $79.5 million award was per se exces-
sive, so long as the jury's discretion was guided. Like
previous punitive damages cases, Philip Morris grabbed
available at
http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=l 10009694.92 Douglas W. Kmiec, Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court Loses Its
Unanimity, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2160286.
93 Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on
Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 423, 432 (2004) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ver-
mont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989)).
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headlines with its multi-million dollar reversal of fortunes,
but the true significance will likely be more subtle as lower
courts attempt to implement the Court's holding.
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KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON: THE SWEEPING
GRANT OF GOVERNMENT POWER AND THE CON-
DEMNATION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY RIGHTS
Ian P. Hennessey
On June 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court
issued its ruling in the now infamous case of Kelo v. City of
New London.' In its first major ruling on eminent domain
since 1984,2 the Court decided whether a city's exercise of
its eminent domain power to transfer property to private
developers complied with the "public use" requirement of
the Fifth Amendment.
3
In 1984, the Court held that under the Fifth
Amendment, a government may use its eminent domain
power as long as it is "rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose" as defined by the legislature. 4 Because of
the Court's ruling, virtually no check on government use
(or abuse) of eminent domain to seize property from private
individuals and transfer it to private entities now exists.
This article is divided into three main sections. In
the first section, I will briefly summarize the development
of law concerning eminent domain, focusing mainly on
cases cited by the Court in its opinion. In the second sec-
tion, I will summarize the Kelo case, beginning with its
factual background and lower court decisions and ending
with a summary of the Court's treatment of the case. In the
third section, I will analyze and critique the Court's reason-
ing as well as the alternative approaches offered by the
other Justices. In the process, I will argue that the Court's
deference to legislative determinations is not only a flawed
1 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.").
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
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argument but also threatens to diminish the fundamental
right of property.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
Nowhere in the Constitution is the power of emi-
nent domain enumerated. Rather, the power is implied by
the Fifth Amendment, 5 which states, in relevant part, that
private property shall not be "taken for public use, without
,6just compensation." The scope of "public use" was not
elaborated by the Framers.
Early Court rulings supported the notion that "pub-
lic use" was interpreted narrowly. In Calder v. Bull,7 Jus-
tice Chase declared that a legislative act that purports to
"take property from A. and give it to B" would be "con-
trary to the greatfirst principles of the social compact" and
"cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative
authority."
8
By the dawn of the twentieth century, the Court
gradually abandoned the natural law principles articulated
by Justice Chase in favor of what the Court now refers to as
"the broader and more natural interpretation of public use
as 'public purpose."' 9 In Clark v. Nash,10 the Court deter-
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or in-
dictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.").61d.
7 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
8 d. at 388.
9 Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo IV), 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005);
see, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64
(1896).
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mined whether a taking in which a state government con-
demned privately owned land to be used as an irrigation
ditch to irrigate other privately owned land violated the
"public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment." The
Court upheld the taking by deferring to the determinations
of the state courts. 12  Similarly, in Strickley v. Highland
Boy Gold Mining Co.,13 the Court determined whether a
taking in which the state condemned privately owned land
to be used as an aerial right of way for a privately held
mining company violated the "public use" requirement of
the Fifth Amendment. 14 The Court again upheld the taking
and emphasized "the inadequacy of use by the general
public as a universal test."
' 15
By 1916, the abandonment of "use by the general
public" as the test for determining "public use" was consi-
dered established law. 16 However, the Court maintained
that "the question [what is a public use] remains a judicial
one which this Court must decide in performing its duty of
enforcing the provisions of the Federal Constitution." 17
In Berman v. Parker,18 the Court considered wheth-
er the taking of a non-blighted department store as part of a
broader urban renewal project violated the "public use"
requirement. 19 Under the proposed redevelopment project,
Congress planned to condemn a large blighted area of the
District of Columbia for the construction of roads and pub-
lic buildings and to "lease or sell the remainder as an enti-
10Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."); Clark, 198 U.S. at 367.
See Clark, 198 U.S. at 369-70.
Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining, Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
14 See id. at 529.
15Id. at 531.
16 See Mount Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate
Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916).
17 Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930).18 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
19 See id. at 29-31.
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rety or in parts to a redevelopment company, individual, or
partnership. 20 Although the petitioner's department store
was not blighted, it was nonetheless designated for taking,
and the Court upheld the taking.2 1 The Court stated that the
government's eminent domain power was coterminous with
"the police power," the definition of which "is essentially
the product of legislative determinations addressed to the
purposes of government ... ,,2 The Court determined
that, "[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when
the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation ... ,,3
Therefore, "[t]he role of the judiciary in determining
whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose
is an extremely narrow one."2 4
Three decades later, in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff,25 the Court again considered the "public use" re-
quirement, this time in response to efforts by the State of
Hawaii designed to break up the concentration of land
ownership in its state by allowing for the transfer of fee
simple title from lessors to lessees, at the election of the
lessees, through condemnation proceedings. 26 The Court
upheld the taking and reiterated that "[t]he 'public use'
requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sove-
reign's police power. 27 Therefore, "where the exercise of
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a con-
ceivable public purpose," the Court will not hold "a com-
20 Id. at 30.




25 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
26 See id. at 231-33.
27 Id. at 240.
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The dispute in Kelo v. City of New London
29
emerged from a planned redevelopment of the Fort Trum-
bell area of New London, Connecticut, which suffered from
a poor economy and high unemployment.3 0 In wake of its
worsening economic condition, the city of New London
reactivated the New London Development Corporation
(NLDC), a private nonprofit entity established to assist the
city of New London in planning economic development. 
31
In 1998, the pharmaceutical giant, Pfizer, Inc., an-
nounced that it would open a major research facility in the
Fort Trumbell area. 32 Hoping to draw momentum for eco-
nomic revitalization from Pfizer's arrival, the NLDC
drafted an integrated development plan that focused on
ninety acres of the Fort Trumbell area, including a water-
front conference hotel, a small urban village consisting of
restaurants, shops, office space, residences, several mari-
nas, a pedestrian river walk, a state park, a United States
Coast Guard Museum, and other proposed improvements. 33
In addition, the NLDC would enter into long-term ground
leases with private developers - for nominal rent - in ex-
change for the developers' promise "to develop the land
according to the" plan drafted by the NLDC.34 The NLDC
believed that the plan would revitalize New London's
28 Id. at 241.
29 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
30 See id. at 472-73.
31 See id. at 473.
32 See id.
31 See id. at 474.
34 See id. at 476 n.4.
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economy by creating new jobs and generating tax reve-
nue. 
35
"[A]pproximately 115 privately owned properties,"
including those owned by the petitioners, were located in
the area designated for redevelopment by the NLDC. 36 Of
the fifteen properties in the Fort Trumbell area owned by
the petitioners, ten were "occupied by the owner or a fami-
ly member," whereas "the other five [were] held as invest-
ment properties." 37 To acquire the land necessary to realize
the ambitious development plan, New London authorized
the NLDC to condemn land through eminent domain pro-
ceedings.
38
Although the NLDC succeeded in negotiating the
purchase of most of the property located in the Fort Trum-
bell area, it failed to convince the petitioners to sell.39 In
November 2000, the NLDC began condemnation proceed-
ings to acquire the petitioners' properties. 40  Petitioners
filed suit claiming, in part, that the proposed taking of their
property for a "public benefit" violated the "public use"
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 4 1 The trial court
42granted injunctive relief to the petitioners. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut held that all the proposed
takings were valid.43 The court concluded, inter alia, that
the proposed takings qualified as a "public use" under both
the Connecticut and United States Constitutions, 44 stating
that "economic development projects . . . that have the
3 See id. at 474.
36 See id. at 473-74.





42 See Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo 1), No. 557299, 2002 WL
500238, at *112 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
43 Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 843 A.2d 500, 574 (Conn.
2004).
44 Id. at 527.
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public economic benefits of creating new jobs, increasing
tax and other revenues, and contributing to urban revitaliza-
tion, satisfy the public use clauses of the state and federal
constitutions." 45  Following the ruling of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut, the petitioners appealed to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, which granted certiora-
ri.
46
OPINION OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court focused its inquiry on "whether
the city's proposed disposition of this property qualifies as
a 'public use' within the meaning of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. . .. ,47 The Court held that the tak-
ings "unquestionably serve[d] a public purpose" and there-
fore, satisfied the "public use" requirement of the Fifth
Amendment.
48
The Court began its inquiry by dismissing as illegi-
timate any use of the eminent domain power, which at-
tempts to "take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to ... B," even if paid just compensation.49
However, the majority emphasized that the Court had "long
ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned prop-
erty be put into use for the general public." 50  By the
Court's reasoning, such a narrow view of the "public use"
requirement was not only "difficult to administer" but also
"impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs
of society." 51  Citing its precedent in Strickley52 and
45 Id. at 520.
46 Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo 111), 542 U.S. 965 (2004).
47 Kelo v. City of New London, (Kelo IV) 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
481 Id. at 484.
49Id. at 477.
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Clark,53 among other cases, the Court reaffirmed its rejec-
tion of the "narrow test" requiring use by the general pub-
lic. 54 Instead, the Court chose to embrace what it called
"the broader and more natural interpretation of public use
as 'public purpose."' 55 Thus, although conceding that New
London was not "planning to open the condemned land...
to use by the general public" and that the private lessees
would not "in any sense be required to operate like com-
mon carriers, making their services available to all com-
ers,",56 the Court concluded that these facts alone did not
violate the "public use" requirement.
Rather, the Court turned its analysis to whether the
development plan served a "public purpose."' 57 Relying on
its precedents in Berman and Midkiff,58 the Court reaf-
firmed that "[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined
[public purpose] broadly, reflecting our longstandingxolicy
of deference to legislative judgments in this field." As
long as "the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational" the Court will not pass judgment
"over the wisdom of the takings." 60
The Court rejected the petitioners' argument for the
establishment of a "bright line rule" 61 preventing the trans-
fer of condemned property to private entities, holding that
its precedents "foreclose[d] this objection" because "the
government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit
52 See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining, Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531
(1906).
53 See Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 368 (1905).
54 Kelo IV, 545 U.S. at 480-81.
55 d. at 480.
5 6 Id. at 478-79.
57 Id. at 480.
58Id. at 484-85.
59Id. at 480.60/d. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-
43 (1984)).61Id. at 484.
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individual private parties. ' 62 Citing its precedent in Mid-
kif, the Court stressed that a "taking's purpose and not its
mechanics" determined "public use."
63
The Court also rejected the petitioners' argument
that economic development takings "should require a 'rea-
sonable certainty' that the expected public benefits will
actually accrue." 64 The Court responded that such heigh-
tened scrutiny "would represent an even greater departure
from our precedent ' 65 in which the legislature's stated
purpose was subjected only to a rational basis test. 66 The
Court determined that "[t]he disadvantages of a heightened
form of review are especially pronounced" in economic
development takings because the "required postponement
of the judicial approval" necessary for such a test would
"impose a significant impediment to the successful con-
summation of many such plans."
67
ANALYSIS
The Kelo ruling presents a twofold, mutually rein-
forcing problem: (1) no concrete, objective definition of
what constitutes a "public use" exists and (2) the "public
use" requirement is satisfied solely upon the legislative
determination that the use is "public" and that the taking is
"legitimate." Thus, the government's power to condemn
land through eminent domain is virtually unchecked, and
fundamental property rights are at the mercy of the gov-
ernment officials' whims.
To comply with the Fifth Amendment, a taking
must be for "public use." The definition of "public use"
must be clearly defined to determine the limits on govern-
62 Id. at 485.
63Id. at 482.
64 Id. at 487.
65 Id. at 487-88.
66 id.
67 Id. at 488.
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ment power. The Court fails to provide such a definition,
rather electing to adopt whatever the legislative body de-
termines to be a "public purpose" under its "longstanding
policy of deference to legislative judgments ...."68 In-
deed, the Court announced that as long as "the legislature's
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational" the
Court will not pass judgment "over the wisdom of [the]
takings. 69 In Kelo, the sufficient "public purpose" that the
NLDC determined was "new jobs and increased tax reve-
nue."570 In reality, this purported public use was simply the
aggregate collection of private benefits (new jobs) and the
government benefit of increased revenue (new taxes). The
Court announced only one exception to its deference to
legislative determinations: circumstances in which the
government attempts to condemn privately held land "for
the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular
private party." 71  However, as Justice O'Connor noted,
"[t]he trouble with economic development takings is that
private benefit and incidental public benefit are, by defini-
tion, merged and mutually reinforcing." 72 Thus, as Justice
O'Connor noted in her dissent, "it is difficult to envision
anyone but the 'stupid staffer]' failing" the Court's ration-
al basis scrutiny.
73
For her part, Justice O'Connor suggested a defini-
tion of "public use" that attempts to reconcile the majority
opinion that she authored in Midkiff.74 Justice O'Connor's
proposed test would allow governments to transfer con-
demned property to private entities only under special cir-
68 Id. at 480.
69 Id. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-
43 (1984)).70 Id. at 483.
71 Id. at 477 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245).
72 Id. at 502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73 Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26
n.12 (1992)).
74 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 231.
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cumstances. Thus, takings that transfer condemned proper-
ty to private entities would still comply with the "public
use" requirement if they involve the elimination of "exist-
ing property use . . to remedy harm."75 Unfortunately,
Justice O'Connor's test is equally vulnerable to the defe-
rence afforded by the Court to legislative determinations
because without a clear definition, "harm" is a subjective
standard. In the end, legislatures would merely shift the
emphasis of their findings to discover a "harm" rather than
a "public purpose." Unless the Court determined a more
precise meaning of "harm," or in the alternative, the level
of harm needed to justify condemnation, Justice
O'Connor's test cannot effectively guarantee the property
rights of those whose property is targeted for taking.
As Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, "the most
natural reading of the Clause is that it allows the govern-
ment to take property only if the government owns, or the
public has a legal right to use, the property . ,,76 Under
Justice Thomas' approach, takings would only satisfy the
"public use" requirement when the public actually used the
property.77 Thus, the extent of a court's inquiry would be
simply to determine "whether the government owns" the
subject property or whether "the public has a legal right to
use, the taken property., 78 Consequently, the traditional
power of eminent domain would remain intact, allowing
governments to take land for public buildings and for
common carriers who serve the public at large. Private
property, however, would be protected against transfers to
private entities that do not serve the public at large. This
approach would prevent the possibility of transfers de-
signed to confer private benefits on certain, favored private
71 Kelo IV, 545 U.S. at 500.76 Id. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see id. at 506-11.
77 Id. at 521.
" Id. at 517.
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entities with only "incidental public benefits." 79 Although
his formulation is strict, Justice Thomas presents the only
concrete, objective definition of "public use" that draws a
clear line between what a government can and cannot do.
The Court's decision to abstain from an objective
definition of "public use" does not only result in the failure
to define the outer limits of government power. At the very
least, the Court is guilty of begging the question: the legis-
lature's purpose must be public, but the legislature deter-
mines what constitutes a public purpose. Allowing the
legislature to determine whether the use is "public" and
whether the taking is "legitimate" is both unnecessary and
unjust. The public interest, as presented by the legislative
body, is already represented in the court proceeding by the
government's attorneys. It is unnecessary for a court to
represent the government's position as well. Furthermore,
legislative determination is unjust because no disinterested
review of the proposed taking's legitimacy exists. By way
of analogy, it would be as if the law required a court to
defer to the prosecutor's determination of a criminal defen-
dant's guilt. In this type of situation, how are landowners
afforded any meaningful due process under the Fifth
Amendment when the Court has stacked the odds so heavi-
ly in favor of the government? As Justice O'Connor stated,
"[a]n external, judicial check on how the public use re-
quirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if
this constraint on government power is to retain any mean-
ing.",s
Perhaps sensing these problems, Justice Kennedy
proposed a "meaningful rational basis" test for a "narrowly
drawn category of takings" involving "private transfers in
which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of
private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or
otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use
'9 See id. at 502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'0 Id. at 497.
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Clause."81 Kennedy concludes that the Court "should
strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to
favor a particular private party, with only incidental or
pretextual public benefits .... 182
However, it is difficult to see how Justice Kenne-
dy's test is in any way "meaningful." By preserving "the
presumption that the government's actions were reasonable
and intended to serve a public purpose," 83 Justice Kenne-
dy's test provides little reason to believe that a property
owner could mount a successful challenge to a legislature's
stated intentions. Justice O'Connor also criticized Kenne-
dy's test, complaining that it failed to specify "what courts
should look for in a case with different facts, how they will
know if they have found it, and what to do if they do not."
' 84
For his part, Justice Kennedy declined to "conjecture as to
what sort of cases might justify a more demanding standard
,,85
However, Justice Kennedy's reservations, as well as
the objections of Justices Thomas and O'Connor, indicate
the deeper, far more pernicious problem presented by the
majority opinion: virtually no check exists on the govern-
ment's ability to take property from its citizens based on
even the slightest pretense.
The Kelo decision, however, was not a revolutio-
nary gesture. The majority opinion is unquestionably con-
sistent with takings precedent, as it has evolved over the
last two centuries. Instead, the Kelo decision represents the
dangerous and perverse culmination of that evolution. The
result is that the Takings Clause has emerged as a sword of
government power rather than a shield for individual prop-
erty rights.
81 Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
12 /d. at 491.
83 id.
84 Id. at 502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Dangerously absent from the Court's analysis is the
basic acknowledgment that property is a fundamental right
that the Takings Clause shields. James Madison, the archi-
tect of the Constitution and the original drafter of the Tak-
ings Clause,86 "feared that the government's power to take
property, if left unrestricted, could jeopardize private prop-
erty rights."87  Thus, this concern was enshrined: "No
person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ."88 In 1792, just months
after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, James Madison
declared, "Government is instituted to protect property of
every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of
individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses.
This being the end of government, that alone is a just gov-
ernment, which impartially secures to every man, whatever
is his own." 89  As Justice Thomas correctly noted in his
dissent, the Framers understood property as a "natural,
fundamental right," 90 and as such, "it is 'imperative that the
Court maintain absolute fidelity to' the [Public Use]
Clause's express limit on the power of the government over
the individual, no less than with every other liberty express-
86 See JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 443 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Literary
Classics of the United States, Inc. 1999).
87 Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain
Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence,
92 CORNELL L. REv. 1,9 (2006) (citing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLrrICs AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrFU-
TION 314-15 (1996) ("noting that Madison's 'concern about the security
of private rights was rooted in a palpable fear that economic legislation
was jeopardizing fundamental rights of property' and that 'by 1787 a
decade of state legislation had enabled Madison to perceive how eco-
nomic and financial issues could forge broad coalitions across society,
which could then actively manipulate the legislature to secure their
desired ends')).
88 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89 MADISON, supra note 86, at 515.
90 Kelo IV, 545 U.S. at 510 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ly enumerated in the Fifth Amendment or the Bill of Rights
more generally."
91
Confronted with the conflict between an expansive
government power and an express fundamental right, defe-
rence should have been paid to the petitioners' property
rights rather than the City's determinations of "public pur-
pose." Although the Court pays tribute to Justice Chase's
famous statement in Calder v. Bull,92 which forbids "a law
that takes property from A and gives it to B,"93 the Court
would do well to acknowledge Justice Chase's immediately
preceding statement, which forbids "a law that makes a
man a Judge in his own cause."94 Instead, the Court has
chosen to make the government the judge in its own cause
in determining the existence of a "public use" and for the
very purpose of taking property from A and giving it B.
In Kelo, the Court breached its duty to protect fun-
damental individual rights from the government's ambi-
tious and intrusive designs. Although greatly expanding
the definition of "public use," the Court simultaneously
refused to include any corresponding protection of individ-
ual property rights in its analysis. At the very least, the
Court's analysis should have balanced legislative interests
against the individual property rights of the affected lan-
downers. Although the Court imposes strict demands and
heightened scrutiny in virtually every other scenario in
which government action impedes on constitutional rights,
the Court has proved remarkably timid about applying such
protections to property rights in takings cases. However, as
James Madison said, "[i]f the United States mean to obtain
or deserve the full praise due to wise and just governments,
91 Id. at 507 (internal quotations omitted).
92Id. at 478 n.5 (majority opinion).
93 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
94 id.
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they will equally respect the rights of property, and the
property in rights ... 95
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London
will stand as a case in which the Court failed to acknowl-
edge and to protect fundamental property rights guaranteed
under the Constitution. Instead, the Court chose to defer
entirely to the judgment of the legislative entities whose
aim was to deprive its citizens of their fundamental rights
and to transfer their property to other private entities, all in
the name of creating "new jobs and increased tax reve-
nue.",96 Confronted with these facts, the Court should have
applied a heightened standard of review to protect private
property owners against this highly questionable applica-
tion of the eminent domain power. The Court refused, and
in so doing, "all private property is now vulnerable to being
taken and transferred to another private owner .. . who will
use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to
the public . .. .97
95 MADISON, supra note 86, at 517.96 Kelo IV, 545 U.S. at 483.
97 Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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